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THE ALI PROPOSALS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK
,OPTIONS AND RESTRICTED STOCK ON DIVORCE: THE
RISKS OF THEORY MEET THE THEORY OF RISK
DAVID S. ROSETTENSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional marriage vow's "for better for worse, for richer
for poorer, in sickness and in health, . . . till death us do part"'
represents the most comprehensive expression possible of the risks
assumed by a marrying couple. The covered risks include those
intrinsic to the marriage as well as those risks arising from forces
external to the marriage. Moreover, the vows effectively deal with
the passage of time, the one omnipresent variable in the process of
risk evaluation and risk adjustment. Would that the premises of
domestic life had remained constant!
The American Law Institute (ALI) is in the last stages of the
process of evaluating the laws applicable to the dissolution of a
marriage. The ALI is proposing that states amend their laws so as
to embody certain principles governing the financial remedies
available on divorce.2 In many instances, these proposals would
amount to a significant overhaul of these remedies. One interesting
aspect of the draft proposals is the way they reflect presumptions
regarding the risks people assume in domestic relationships. This
article will examine how these risk assumptions play out upon
divorce with respect to the treatment of certain employment
compensation packages. Incentive based packages are playing a
rapidly increasing role in employee compensation,3 and, at least
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. This article is dedicated to
my assistant, Chauncey. Also, I would like to thank Mary Ferrari, Toni Robinson, and Mary
Moers Wenig for introducing me to the taxation of options.
1. THE AMERICAN BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 301 (1928).
2. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [hereinafter PFD].
3. A recent survey suggests that in 1999 nineteen percent of employees were eligible to
participate in stock option plans, an increase from the twelve percent who were able to
participate in 1998. Frederic M. Biddle, A Special News Report About Life on the Job and
Trends Taking Place There, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2000, at Al. The number of people holding
options is estimated to have reached the ten million mark. See Amy Zipkin, Stock Option
Splitsville, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2000, at Cl. A survey of fifty large U.S. companies in 1999
found that nearly fifty percent of them granted options to all of their employees. See Michael
J. Powe et al., America's Best Company Benefits, MONEY, Oct. 1999, at 103. In May 2000,
Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to exclude the value of stock options received
by hourly paid workers from the amount used to calculate the employee's overtime
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among certain classes of employees, may be starting to overwhelm
conventional compensation packages.4 This article will focus on
stock options and restricted stock offered by the employer.5 These
compensatory devices carry with them substantial elements of risk
that generally are independent of the risks directly associated with
the marriage of the spouse-employee. Some of the carried risks
compensation. Worker Economic Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-202, § 2(a)(3), 114 Stat.
308 (2000). Nor are we just concerned with pocket change. A survey of sixty "new economy"
companies found that their chief executives held options where the median holding was nearly
$15,000,000 and the average holding was a staggering $121,000,000. Even among "old
economy" stocks, of 100 corporations surveyed, the median option holding was about
$5,500,000 and the average holding was worth nearly $23,000,000. See David Leonhardt,
Report on Executive Pay, In Options Age, Rising Pay (and Risk), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, § 3,
at 1. One estimate puts the value of stock options exercised by employees of U.S. corporations
during 1999 at $35,000,000,000. Martin A. Sullivan, Let the Good Times Roll: Options and
Tax-Free Profits, TAX ANALYSTS NOTES TODAY, May 26, 2000, at 1185. Responding to changes
in compensation trends, in 2000 the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics
began surveying the incidence of stock option plans and the impact on compensation costs
across all industries and all occupations in the country. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX, NOTES (Dec. 1999), available at
http://stats.bls.gov/ect/sp/ecnr0022.txt (last visited Nov. 14, 2001). See generally Jan Harden
Webster & Margaret de Lisser, Divorcing the Executive: QDRO (DRO) Issues, 14 AM. J. FAM.
L. 146 (2000) (discussing that executive compensation is increasingly dominated by options
and similar compensation devices).
4. See generally Joan S. Lublin, Net Envy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2000, at R1 (discussing
study by William M. Mercer, Inc., in 1999 and the increasing role of options packages in
recruitment and retention of Chief Executive Officers of major industrial and service
concerns). Compensation packages typically included options with a face value of more than
three times the individual's salary, and average restricted stock awards equaled the
recipient's cash pay. Id.
5. The paper makes no effort to tackle the even loftier heights of nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements such as Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPS) and
Supplemental Savings Plans that present other interesting divorce issues. The former looks
like a defined benefit pension, the latter like a defined contribution plan. These schemes
operate beyond the reaches of a conventional ERISA treatment and defer the employee's tax
liability by avoiding conferring on the employee any immediate economic benefit or liability
for constructive receipt of income. The essence of such schemes is a promise of the employer
to pay at some point in the future. For our purposes, the schemes expose the employee to the
risk that the employer's promise becomes valueless, through bankruptcy or insolvency. Direct
transfer of the benefits of such schemes pursuant to a divorce decree ordinarily will not be
possible, although the use of a trust-type approach to convey a beneficial interest (discussed
in other contexts below) might be effective. The beneficiary then becomes subject to the
employee spouse's risks. See Webster & de Lisser, supra note 3, at 150-52.
The paper also does not deal directly with Stock Appreciation Rights (SAR) which
have limited use today for compensating U. S. employees. SARs obligated the employer to pay
the difference between the SAR exercise price and the market value of the underlying stock.
SARs replicated the function of options, but freed the grant from the expansive Securities and
Exchange Commission restrictions that existed on a broadly defined group of "insiders,"
preventing these individuals from exercising and then immediately selling options. Revision
of SEC regulations in 1991 made the use of SARs of limited appeal. Victoria M. Trumbower,
Optimizing Stock Option Strategies for Corporate Executives, 25 TAX MGM'T EST., GIFTS & TR.
J. 163 (2000). Again, any risk analysis would start with the value of the employer's
undertaking.
ALI PROPOSALS
relate to the employment relationship, but some relate to factors
that are essentially external to the relationship. The risks
associated with options and restricted stock are ordinarily different
from the risks associated with other compensatory devices.
This article will begin with a brief description of the ALI's
proposals regarding property distribution and income maintenance
awards upon divorce. Then, the article will analyze both the risk
premises of the awards and the risks associated with the remedial
devices the ALI is proposing. These analyses will be followed by a
short description of stock option and restricted stock compensation
packages. The article will then look at the possible bases for a
claimant's access to such schemes under the ALI proposals. The
article will consider the problems of risk allocation that arise with
respect to awards made under each basis, and with respect to the
difficulties flowing from the risk structures inherent in incentive
based schemes. The article will conclude by looking at whether the
ALI proposals are compatible with reliance on incentive based
schemes as sources of property and income.
II. THE ALI's PROPOSALS
A. Property Division
Following its analysis, the ALI concluded that most
jurisdictions believe in the principle of equitable distribution of
assets on divorce.' Beyond that, however, there are significant
differences among the states regarding what assets might be
included in the distribution. In particular, there are differences
regarding whether a presumptive equal distribution ought to be
employed, whether this presumption should apply to all assets or
only to those acquired by a spouse's labor, and the extent to which
access, as a matter of property division, should be available to a
spouse's post-divorce earnings.'
Every state must determine whether a given "asset" is indeed
distributable as "property" under its laws. Then, there is the
question of whether a spouse may lay claim to a particular item of
acknowledged property, and, if so, what share of the item the
claimant should receive. Finally, there is the issue of what value
should be assigned to each party's share of the asset. Jurisdictions
take widely differing approaches to these questions. These topics
6. PFD, supra note 2, at 1-2.
7. Id. at 2-3.
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have particular significance when it comes to the distribution of
incentive based compensation packages.
At the outset of its analysis, the ALI accepts certain
generalizations pertaining to property division. The ALI proposes
property be distributed according to principles that "respect both
spousal ownership rights in their property and the equitable claims
that each spouse has on the property in consequence of their marital
relationship."' Additionally, the ALI's aim is to facilitate the
satisfaction by the spouses of their obligations to support their
children, and to ensure that the spouses "share equitably in the
financial losses arising from the dissolution of their marriage."9
Finally, the goal is to have principles "that are consistent and
predictable in application.""
The ALI declines to define property, and thus refuses to get
involved in the debate of whether a particular "asset" should be
viewed as distributable "property."1 The ALI's position is that the
identification of distributable "property" is a policy question,
informing, for example, the debate whether earning capacity and
goodwill are distributable items of property. 2 Thus, the ALI
espouses the position that a definition of property that differs from
its meaning in other areas of law is neither necessary nor
desirable. 1"
The ALI takes the view that property acquired during the
marriage, rather than by gift or inheritance, is "marital property"
such that a spouse may lay claim to it.'4 The ALI adopts the
approach taken by the majority of states that if property is earned
by spousal labor during the marriage, a claim of shared ownership
upon divorce may be made."
Regarding the specifics of property division, the ALI proposes
that when property is divided on divorce, the spouses should receive
"net shares equal in value, although not necessarily identical in
kind." 6 This proposal stems from the notion that property division
on divorce reflects the tension between the goal of reflecting a
spouse's relative contribution to the acquisition of marital property,
on the one hand, and the desire to allocate resources based on the
8. Id. § 4.02(1), at 83.
9. Id. § 4.02(2), at 83.
10. Id. § 4.02(3), at 83.
11. Id. § 4.03, cmt. a, at 90.
12. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.03, cmt. a, at 90.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 87-90.
15. Id. at 88.
16. Id. § 4.15(1), at 194.
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spouse's relative need on the other. "These principles conflict
because [they are] usually inversely related [...giving the judge] no
idea how to divide the property....','7 The ALI proposal attempts to
steer a middle course between these two concerns by permitting
departure from a presumption of equal division only in specific
instances where the aim is to address a spouse's claim for a
compensable loss.'8
The ALI acknowledges that the proposed equal division
presumption is a rough compromise between the competing claims
of contribution and need.'9 Furthermore, the rule follows logically
from the premise of sharing that identifies assets acquired during
the marriage as marital property.2" The ALI rejects the notion that
a spouse's claim is grounded on the premise that he or she made an
equalfinancial contribution to the marriage.2 ' Rather, the ALI view
is that the equal division claim should be grounded on the premise
that each spouse contributes equally to the marriage, "not just to
the accumulation of financial assets."22 The presumption is admit-
tedly an "ideological norm"23 in which marriage is regarded as more
than a sum of its financial parts.
Important for our purposes is that the ALI acknowledges in
certain cases spousal labor during the marriage produces benefits
which accrue only after the marriage is dissolved. 4 The ALI's
position is that property earned by labor performed during the
marriage is distributable marital property, even if the property is
received after the marriage has ended.2" Where the "property"
represents a contingent return on labor performed during. the
marriage and, in particular, where it reflects compensation that is
contingent on post-marital events, the ALI's view is the "property"
is marital property to the extent it was earned during the
marriage.2 s In essence, the asset is characterized according to when
the spouse earns it, rather than according to when the spouse
receives it.
17. Id. § 4.15(1), cmt. a, at 194-95.
18. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.15, cmt. a, at 195; § 5.01, cmt. a, at 257.
19. Id. § 4.15, cmt. a, at 195-96.
20. Id. § 4.15, cmt. b, at 196.
21. Id. at 196-98.
22. Id. § 4.15, cmt. c, at 198.
23. Id. Reporter's Notes, cmt. c, at 210 (citing JOHN EEKELAAR & MAVIS MACLEAN,
MAINTENANCE AFrER DIVORCE 45 (1986)).
24. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.03, cmt. b, at 89.
25. Id. § 4.08(1) & (3), at 168-69.
26. Id. § 4.08(1)(b), at 168.
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Where an asset's receipt is contingent on future events, the
contingency may produce two discrete domains of uncertainty.
First, of course, there may be an issue of whether the asset will
accrue at all. Second, there may be a further uncertainty regarding
the value the asset may have when and if it becomes due. As a
technical matter, the ALI takes the view that a court should use the
most recent valuation date practical when dividing assets, even if
the spouse ceased acquiring the property at an earlier date.2 ' The
argument is that "[t]he parties will thus be affected equally by
market fluctuations during the pendency of their divorce
proceedings.' There is one notable exception to this position,
however, which is particularly relevant to our concerns. The ALI
accepts that a "different rule is appropriate..., where the value of
marital property is altered by the activities of either spouse after
the cut-off date for marital acquisitions."29 Any increase in value of
the asset flowing from the post-marriage labor of the spouse should
be treated as that spouse's separate property.
To take the edge off some of the uncertainties associated with
the valuation of a contingent future receipt, the ALI suggests that
if the value of a spouse's future share can be determined on
dissolution, that value can be included in determining the value of
the pool of assets available for distribution between the spouses.3 °
If the value is uncertain at the time of divorce, however, the court
either should be free to assign a share of the asset's value when and
if it materializes, or should be able to reserve jurisdiction to make
a distribution at a future date when the value becomes known.3'
While, at first blush, these proposals appear to be eminently
reasonable, the entire ALI goal is to distribute value equally. It is
difficult to imagine how this can be done effectively if only a portion
of the distribution is deferred to a later date, or, even then, if a
contingent asset is distributed on any basis other than equally. We
shall return to these themes in due course.
The ALI's principles covering property distribution relate to the
distribution of value, not specific assets, and therefore, at one level
the principles readily handle the traditional overlap found in
American law between the concepts of property division and of
alimony.32 Conceptually, enhanced property division awards can be
27. Id. § 4.03, cmt. f, at 95.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.08(3), at 169.
31. Id. § 4.08(3)(a) & (b), at 169.
32. Id. §.4.15, cmt. d, at 199.
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the financial analog of periodic alimony payments." The ALI
proposal recognizes a thorny problem, however, which has
significance for our concerns. If property division is to be relied
upon to provide spousal support, one must have confidence in the
valuation of the resources available to satisfy the claim.34 This, as
we will see, presents some difficulties where a substantial
component of the marital estate may be reflected by a contingent
asset of uncertain value.
In contrast, under the ALI analysis, periodic payments for
spousal maintenance may be modifiable,35 and thus may better lend
themselves to addressing the uncertainties associated with assets
such as stock options. Accordingly, we now turn to the ALI
proposals for modifiable awards.
B. Compensatory and Restitutionary Awards, Not Alimony
The ALI analysis concludes that while current awards of
alimony reflect an unease with traditional rationales for such
awards, no clear-cut justification for an alimony award has
emerged, except to the extent that there is some recognition of the
necessity to meet a claimant's "need."36 Even then, no consensus
exists as to how "need" is to be determined.37 The ALI review
acknowledges that there is a substantial overlap between property
division and alimony awards.3" The ALI report points out that while
no-fault promoters hoped that adequate equitable distribution of
property would displace alimony awards, this has proved to be an
illusory goal in most instances because few couples have capital
resources that are sufficiently large to provide an adequate
replacement for income flow awards.39
The ALI study suggests that it is necessary to develop a
coherent justification for alimony, and to integrate this into the
principles for allocating property.4 ° Accordingly, the ALI proposes
that the law should cease to focus on a claimants "needs," and
instead focus on any "loss" suffered by the claimant as a result of
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 5.09, at 357. It should be noted, however, that the ALI proposals only envision
modification under limited circumstances, not including changing value options. See infra
text accompanying notes 127-30.
36. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.09, at 4-6.
37. Id. § 5.02 cmt. a, at 261.
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 6-7.
40. Id. at 6, 8.
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the termination of the marriage which might entitle the claimant to
"compensatory payments."4' The proposal allows compensatory
awards only where a marriage of significant duration dissolves and
a spouse with less wealth or earning capacity will suffer a loss in
living standard;42 or where one spouse has suffered a loss of earning
capacity because of a disproportionate assumption of responsibilities
for care of children or for care of sick or disabled third parties.4
Additionally, the ALI proposal recognizes a restitutionary claim
where the marriage is dissolved before the- claimant has been able
to recoup an investment in the other spouse's earning capacity44 and
where, in limited circumstances, after a short marriage there will
be a disparity between the spouses' abilities to recover their
premarital standards of living.45
Not all of these theories are directly relevant to this paper
although, in appropriate circumstances, each may lay a foundation
for a claim against resources that may include an incentive based
compensation package. Thus, in the circumstances specified above,
the proposals seek to protect a former spouse against a potential
loss in living standard flowing from the dissolution of the marriage.
For marriages of short duration, the reference standard of living is
that which existed prior to the marriage.46 In longer marriages, the
reference baseline is the marital living standard. One of the
justifications the ALI makes for advancing its "new" awards is that
because alimony payments were traditionally justified on the basis
of "need" rather than on a foundation of equitable entitlement, it
often became necessary to expand the scope of recognizable property
claims, even though property division remedies were not
particularly suited to responding to the premise for the claim.'
The ALI proposed awards fall into two groups. First, there
would be those claims on behalf of a spouse who, after a marriage
of significant duration, experiences a loss in living standard by
virtue of having less wealth or earning capacity. This group also
recognizes claims by individuals who have suffered a loss in earning
capacity during marriage which endures beyond dissolution where
the loss arises by virtue of having borne a disproportionate share of
41. Id. at 8-10.
42. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.03(2)(a), at 271. See id. § 5.05 for details.
43. Id. § 5.03(2)(b) & (c), at 271. See id. § 5.06 and § 5.12 for details. The spouse's lost
earning capacity must be of a sort that continues after dissolution.
44. Id. § 5.03(3)(a), at 272. See id. § 5.15 for details.
45. Id. § 5.03(3)(b), at 272. See id. § 5.16 for details.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 5.02, cmt. a, at 260.
48. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.02, cmt. a, at 262.
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caring for children, a sick or disabled spouse, or a third party in
fulfillment of a moral obligation.49 Where the recovery is based on
the duration of the marriage alone it recognizes the claimant's
expectation to continue to share in the other spouse's income.5 ° The
extent of the claim will be premised on the marriage having
exceeded a minimum duration and will be a function of the dura-
tion, subject to a maximum recovery expressed as a percentage of
the post-marriage income differential of the divorcing spouses.5'
Under this approach, the spouses' post-divorce incomes are not
automatically equalized, but rather the proposal envisages that the
post-divorce gap will lessen the longer the marriage endured, until
ultimately a marriage of sufficient length will produce post-divorce
equality of income.52
For the purposes of the present paper, the idea that compensa-
tory awards may be linked to a spouse's post-divorce income is not
without difficulty when dealing with the possibility that "income"
may be reflected in the realization of deferred contingent interests.
The ALI proposal accepts that the source of income may well be
income from invested capital as well as income from labor.53 The
ALI proposal does permit compensatory awards to be adjusted to
reflect income from an enhanced share of marital assets.' This may
produce a highly complex analysis when dealing with contingent
assets which in due course may produce income. In such scenarios,
compensatory awards may require one to deal with a concept of
what is essentially contingent income. If this is true, the associated
49. Id. § 5.03, cmt. b, at 274.
50. Id.
51. Id. While these principles are relatively easy to apply in instances when neither
former spouse has sufficient income after divorce to support himself or herself at the marital
standard, the formula can become very complex when this is not true and the ALI suggests
judges should retain discretion to deal with such cases. Id. § 5.05, cmt. g, at 298.
52. Id. § 5.05, cmt. g, at 295-99.
53. Id. § 5.05, cmt. f, at 292. The ALI suggests that reference may be had to the principles
it is proposing for determining income for the purposes of fixing child support. PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part II, Apr. 8, 1998) [hereinafter TD3]. This child support
proposal provides little for our assistance beyond noting that an ordinary rate of return should
be imputed to an asset that yields less than an ordinary rate of return, that is the rate of
return for secure investments. TD3, § 3.12(4)(b), at 90. One of the open questions that this
analysis triggers when dealing with the situation where the employee rejects current
payments in favor of contingent future benefits is whether it is correct to view the
employment skill of the contingent interest holder, or the contingent interest itself as the
under-yielding asset. Arguably, neither of these interests is under-performing. Rather, the
benefit is delayed so that the income should be determined on the basis of some discounted
present value of that future performance. This then must raise concerns about the risks
associated with that future performance.
54. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.05, cmt. f, at 293.
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risks may be the risks of the uncertain realization of the underlying
asset, the risks associated with the uncertain value of that asset,
and finally the risks of uncertain income flowing from that value.
In such instances, the ALI idea that compensatory awards represent
a transfer of value,55 rather than specific assets or income, comes
sharply into focus. We will return to these themes in due course.
The first set of income-related claim theories also recognizes
that a claimant may be entitled to compensation for an earning
capacity loss resulting from her disproportionate share of child-care
responsibilities during the marriage.' Under the ALI scheme, the
claimant's recovery is a percentage of the difference between the
spouses' post-divorce incomes, where the percentage is a function of
the period of time for which child-care was provided. 7 For prag-
matic reasons, a primary child-care provider who emerges from a
marriage with an earning capacity which is equal to or greater than
that of the other spouse is precluded from recovering under these
principles, even though the theory suggests that the care-giver may
have lost earning capacity. Recovery is denied on the notion that it
appears to be inequitable to require the less affluent spouse to
support the more affluent care-giver, even though allowing recovery
would tend to drive the spouse with the lower earning capacity into
performing the child-care function, and thus produce economic
efficiencies in the allocation of household duties.' Arguably, the
fact that the spouse with the greater earning capacity assumes the
child-care function reflects a risk and loss allocation assumption
made by the parties. Of course, pushed to extremes, this analysis
might be applied to the underlying decision of the couple to have a
child. This would eliminate the need for any compensatory device
at all.
Ultimately, the ALI proposal seeks to synthesize a claim for
compensation based on the marriage's duration with a claim for
compensation based on child care responsibilities, by arguing the
foundation for the claim is the claimant's disproportionate vulnera-
bility to the financial consequences of divorce.59 The ALI proposal
recognizes this fact by proposing a maximum recovery when
compensation claims are made on both premises. The effect is that
if a child-care function is performed, as the marriage endures, a
potential claimant moves toward a maximum recovery more quickly
55. Id. § 5.05, cmt. g, at 295.
56. Id. § 5.06(1), at 317.
57. Id. § 5.06(4), at 318.
58. Id. § 5.06, illus., at 325.
59. Id. at 328.
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than if no child-care function is performed.6" Essentially, to the
extent that the two rationales for compensatory awards have
embedded in them different risk assumption structures, with the
passage of time these two sets of structures become synthesized.
The ALI advances one further rationale justifying a compensa-
tory award for performing a child-care function. The argument is
that by performing the child-care function the claimant enabled the
other spouse to develop his or her earning capacity. The ALI
assumes the contribution was made on the basis that the contribu-
tor would retain access to the other spouse's enhanced earnings, and
argues that this justifies direct post-divorce access to those earn-
ings. 1 The ALI characterizes the goal of such a claim as compensa-
tion, although arguably it is restitutional in character, albeit the
enrichment component may be difficult to measure. This distinction
is relevant to distribution of stock options and restricted stock upon
divorce where much may hinge on the question of whether a claim
exists to a finite amount or a revenue stream (not to mention a
specific asset). I
The ALI proposal envisions that both types of compensatory
awards just discussed preferably should be for fixed terms rather
than for indefinite duration on the premise that spousal disentan-
glement is good for both the individuals and the legal system." The
hope is that within the specified time frame the claimant will have
recovered all lost earning capacity or have achieved the ability to
sustain an acceptable living standard. In a choice between an
accurate determination of the period necessary to recover from the
loss and the desirability of imposing a limit on the term of the
award so as to limit the obligor's responsibility, the ALI opts for the
latter.6 The difficulty is to determine an appropriate period that
adequately protects the reliance or other premise for the award.
The ALI does, however, accept in certain instances that age and
marital duration will raise a presumption any loss is indefinite. In
those circumstances, an indefinite award will be appropriate
although the ALI is not willing to suggest any particular age or
marital duration, or combination thereof, that necessarily is to
trigger an indefinite award.' The suggestion is indefinite awards
may not be justified even if the obligee does not achieve the marital
60. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.06, at 328. For examples of how the ALI envisions the system
working, see id., illus. 5, 6, 7, at 329-31.
61. Id. § 5.06, at 328.
62. Id. § 5.07, cmt. a, at 339.
63. Id. § 5.07, cmt. b, at 340.
64. Id. § 5.07, cmt. c, at 342.
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standard of living if the standard of living achieved is, at least,
acceptable. In principle, the analysis recognizes that the goal of the
process is loss sharing, not shifting of the entire loss.6" It follows
that if the extent of the potential loss is a function of the risks
associated with a potential income stream, the award should be
subject to those risks.
The second set of claims to be recognized are those which flow
either from a claimant's inability during the marriage to realize a
fair return on an investment in the other spouse's earning capacity,
or where after a short marriage there is an unfair disparity between
the former spouses' ability to recover their pre-marital living
standard. These claims are restitutional in character.66 They are
not limited by the ceilings imposed on the first group of claims, but
generally a claimant who makes a substantial recovery under one
of the themes permitted in the first group will be precluded from
recovering under the second group as well."v The risks assumed
have been rewarded;
Where the recovery is premised on an investment in the other
spouse's earning capacity, the ALI position turns out to be some-
what confused. On the one hand, the recovery is only permitted if
the claimant's efforts have provided a substantial enhancement to
the earning capacity of the other spouse."8 On the other hand, the
recovery is linked and limited, in a formulaic way, to the extent of
the claimant's contributions to the cost of educational and living
expenses.69 The argument made is that, in general, divorce should
not provide an opportunity for a general accounting as to the
allocation of benefits received on marriage. The ALI's position,
however, is the benefit of an education partially funded by the other
spouse should be an exception where a residual financial advantage
remains after divorce. 0 The premises for the disconnect between
contribution and recovery will be explored when we turn to consider
the implied risk allocations within the relationship.
The final significant basis on which the ALI suggests a recovery
can be made applies to short childless marriages which otherwise do
not permit a recovery under ALI principles. Recovery is allowed if,
after the divorce, a disparity exists between the spouses' abilities to
recover their premarital living standards where the disparity is
65. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.07, Reporte's Notes, cmt. c, at 349.
66. Id. § 5.03, at 272; cmt. b, at 275.
67. Id. § 5.03, cmt. b, at 274; § 5.15(2), at 384; § 5.16(1), at 394.
68. Id. § 5.15(1)(c), at 384.
69. Id. § 5.15(4), at 384.
70. Id. § 5.15, cmt. a, at 385.
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inequitable because the claimant made expenditures or gave up
educational or occupational opportunities in order to serve some
purpose the spouses considered important to their marital life.
When the marriage ends, the expended assets must be essentially
unrecoverable, or the lost opportunities must leave the claimant
with an earning capacity significantly less than it was before the
marriage. Generally, the recovery is quantified as either half the
amount necessary for the claimant to recover the premarital
standard of living, or the amount necessary to enable the claimant
a reasonable chance to recover the lost opportunity.71
The ALI position is that, if after a short childless marriage the
parties financial circumstances are as disparate as they were prior
to the marriage, the financial consequences do not arise from the
marriage. Accordingly, no remedy is justified. Ordinarily, it is only
child-care or the passage of time which merges the financial
fortunes of the parties. It therefore will be in only a limited number
of exceptional circumstances, such as where a spouse gave up
employment to his or her significant disadvantage in order to move
with the other spouse, that a remedy aimed at restoring the
claimant to a premarital standard will be triggered.72 Indeed, in
such marriages, if one spouse suffers a loss in premarital living
standard and the other does not, the remedy generally will call for
no more than that the loss be shared, not that the claimant be fully
restored to his or her original situation.7" We now turn to a risk
analysis of this award as well as of the other awards just outlined.
C. Risk Assignment Under the ALI Proposals
1. The Risk Premises of Entitlement Claims
As far as property division is concerned, the ALI's proposals
accept that, in principle, spouses are free to regulate the allocation
of their assets by agreement, including a premarital agreement, to
the extent that individual states will enforce them.74 These pre-
marital agreements reflect the spouses' efforts to assign the risks of
marriage failure between them. States are increasingly willing to
recognize such efforts, subject to certain reservations. In particular,
there is a concern that in the event of a divorce a spouse should not
71. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.16, at 394-95.
72. Id. § 5.16, cmt. a, at 396.
73. Id. § 5.16, cmt. c, at 401. The ALI proposal contains an "escape" provision from these
principles where equity requires it. Id. § 5.16(3), at 394; cmt. d, at 405.
74. Id. § 4.01, at 81-82.
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be left without adequate resources - at least to the level of becoming
a public charge - and that otherwise the contractual allocation of
risks should not, on analysis, prove to be procedurally or substan-
tively unconscionable. Additionally, there are on-going concerns
about relative power in the bargaining process and the appropriate-
ness of reducing the marriage to an economic bargain." But the
reality of the current situation is that in the absence of the parties'
agreement the law and the courts essentially are driven on an ex
post facto basis to determine the "bargain" anyway.
In the absence of express risk assumption or assignment by the
parties, the ALI proposals bring a number of principles into play.
Regarding property division, the lynchpin theme is one of a
presumption of equal division of marital property. The premise is
one of sharing the rewards of both financial and non-financial
marital contributions. This principle is readily applicable to those
instances where the "rewards" are defined and can be realized on
the dissolution of the marriage. The analysis becomes problematic,
however, when the existence of the "reward," the asset, is uncertain
or its valuation difficult. Moreover, the ALI analysis specifically
rejects the idea that an asset should be allocated to a spouse simply
based on that spouse's financial contribution to the asset's acquisi-
tion.76 Accordingly, would it be appropriate to place at either
spouse's door all the risks associated with the asset's realization?
More plausible would be a model that allocates the risk of realiza-
tion equally between the claimants." Given that an ALI assump-
tion is both parties acquire an interest in marital property by virtue
of a contribution to the marriage itself rather than a financial
contribution to the acquisition of any specific asset, and both parties
derive benefits from the marriage while it continues, 8 that certainly
75. "[A] conventional contract rationale would require describing the spousal relation in
exchange terms that seem inapt because the parties define their relation by its nonfinancial
aspects even though financial sharing is an important part of it." Id. § 5.05, cmt. b, at 285.
For a collection of references relating to a contract based analysis, see PFD, supra note 2,
Reporter's Notes, cmt. b, at 302-04.
76. Id. § 4.15, cmt. b, at 196.
77. Thus, in Chammah v. Chammah, the court stated: "The wife is entitled to know at the
present time the assets she will have and not wait for some time in the future. In order to
receive such an equitable share due to the large amount of 'contingent resources,' she must
share in some of the risk of forfeiture." FA 95145944S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1896, at *16
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 1997) (citing Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 803-04, 663 A.2d
365 (1995)). The court then allocated the wife a percentage of the stock option and restricted
stock schemes, but not an equal share of them. Id. at *31. In the absence of reliable risk
discounting devices, the only way a risk prone asset can be distributed equitably is by equal
division.
78. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.15, cmt. c, at 197-98.
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would be the way the ALI would assume the parties allocated the
risks during the marriage,79 at least in the absence of evidence to
the contrary. Presumably, too, this point can be made more forcibly
once the use of incentive based compensation packages becomes
more widespread. Notably, under the ALI proposals, the parties'
risk sharing becomes disengaged if one of the spouse's efforts after
the date for identifying marital property affects the value of some of
that property.8" The ALI specifically indicates that this is the case
where these efforts enhance the value of the property.8 ' Fairness
would suggest where the value of the property declines as a result
of these endeavors the other spouse should be locked intothe higher
antecedent value. After all, the risk sharing partnership came to an
end at the relevant date. Whether it is possible to convert the
employee spouse to an underwriter of the value of an incentive
based compensation package, however, appears to be highly proble-
matic.
The ALI's proposals for compensatory payments to distribute
income losses flowing from the failure of the marriage rely on a
somewhat more complex model of risk allocation. The ALI analysis
suggests that spouses have a financial stake in their marriage and
a dependent spouse - one whose income earning capacity is less
than the other's - faces the possibility the passage of time will
gradually increase her risk to the point where she will be unable to
replace her financial stake if the marriage breaks down.82 Thus, it
has been suggested that the divorce process should, in a formulaic
way,' move in the direction of eliminating, at least for a period of
time, any post-divorce income disparity between the former spouses.
The argument is that a no-fault analysis suggests that the marriage
breakdown, like its creation, is a matter of joint responsibility.'
The underlying rationale is the sustained income disparity which
endures over time is a matter the risks of which both parties,
expressly or implicitly, assumed. Accordingly, as time passes the
risks of failure are ultimately to be borne equally.' Conversely, in
the earlier years of the marriage, the burden of failure, at least as
79. This tends to be borne out by the fact that the ALI advises that distribution should
occur on the basis of the latest available valuation data so that the parties equally are
subjected to market fluctuations. Id. § 4.03, cmt. f, at 95.
80. Id.
81. Id. This is because the ALI's position is the claimant should not share in any increase
in value of an asset where that increase is attributable to one spouse's post-divorce labor.
82. Id. § 5.05, cmt. c, at 288.
83. Id. § 5.05(3), at 281.
84. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.05, cmt. c, at 287.
85. Id. § 5.05, Reporter's Notes, cmt. g, at 315.
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far as income disparity is concerned, may be borne disproportion-
ately by one spouse alone.
Work in a related area suggests that the root of the risk
assumption may be viewed as fairly deep-seated. Thus, evidence
suggests that individuals select mates of similar socio-economic
status.8 6 Accordingly, the argument is made that, to the extent that
child rearing produces an economic disparity between the two, the
higher earning spouse's income is an appropriate benchmark of the
lower earning spouse's detriment from the relationship. 7 In a
society where mate selection is voluntary, this analysis seems to
hold up in all contexts where one of the spouses assumed a particu-
lar socio-economic role in the marriage and suffered economic
detriment as a result. This analysis suggests that not only did the
parties assume the risks as to who would bear any post-divorce
obligation, but also that they effectively assumed the extent of the
risk. This analysis would tend to be reinforced by the ALI view that
as the marriage lengthens, the marital standard of living replaces
the premarital standard as the reference baseline. While, in
principle, the parties might avoid these results by prenuptial
agreement, at least under existing law, it is likely that their actual
risk assumption might be overridden in favor of a socially imposed
model of risk assumption where the result is construed as uncon-
scionable, or perhaps even simply inequitable.
In contrast, the ALI proposes to impose the obligation of
making compensatory income payments to a spouse who assumed
the role of primary caretaker of a child.' The basis for this award
is the assumption that the parent who takes on the role of primary
caretaker does so in the expectation that the marriage will endure
and that she will continue to share in the income of the other
parent.8 9 The presumption of entitlement arises from the fact that
minor children resided in the household for a minimum period of
time and that on dissolution the claimant's earning capacity is
substantially less than that of the other spouse.9°  While the
presumption that the claimant provided a disproportionate share of
the child care is rebuttable,9 ' the assumption that child care
86. See, e.g., GARY BURTLESS, BROOKINGS INST., EFFECTS OF GROWING WAGE DISPARITIES
AND CHANGING FAMILY COMPOSITION ON THE U.S. INCOME DISTRIBUTION, July 1999, available
at http://www.brook.edu/dynamics/papers/disparities/disparities.pdf (discussing, in part, the
growing positive correlation of husbands' and wives' earnings).
87. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.06, Reporter's Notes, cmt. e, at 337.
88. Id. § 5.06, at 317-19.
89. Id. § 5.06, cmt. a, at 319.
90. Id. § 5.06(2), at 317-18.
91. Id. § 5.06, crnt. c, at 321.
responsibilities adversely affected the claimant's earning capacity
is not rebuttable.9 2 This assumption is made because of the
difficulty of identifying what a claimant's earning capacity would
have been had different lifestyle choices been made.93 Not only does
the assumption bridge the potential causal gap, but the assump-
tion's rationale provides a justification for disconnecting the
character of the loss from the quantum of recovery which is now
primarily driven by the non-care-provider's income. Moreover, and
this is significant for our purposes, the link is established to the
earnings of the latter spouse together with the risks associated with
the source of those earnings. In short,. by caring for the couple's
child, the caregiver loses risk autonomy in return for income
replacement.
The rationale for the payments to the parent providing child-
care is not really one of risks assumed. Rather, the imposition of
the obligation occurs a's a matter of law, and is independent of any
agreement between the spouses. 94 It reflects both parents' underly-
ing obligation to the child. The couple may identify the parent who
is to discharge the obligation, but because the underlying obligation
belongs to both parents, the ALI assigns the risk of the conse-
quences that may materialize in the event of a failed marriage.
Again, the actual amount of the award is to be formulaic, reflecting,
as described above, the post-divorce income disparity between the
spouses and the duration of the child-care. Here, as to the amount
of the compensation, the analysis does merge with the risk-assump-
tion model described above.
The ALI recognizes that relating the child-care compensatory
claim to the earning capacity divergence of the spouses is but a
proxy for the claimant's loss of earning capacity through performing
the child-care function.95 This proxy link is justified on the basis
that people choose mates of similar socio-economic status so that the
spouse's earning capacity is a better measure of the claimant's loss
capacity than most. Moreover, the claimant presumably undertook
the primary caretaker role on the assumption and expectation that
the marriage would continue and, accordingly, that the spouses
would continue to share income. 96 The ALI formulation, however,
92. Id. § 5.06, cmt. d, at 322.
93. Group data establishes the fact of earning capacity loss through performing the child-
care function as a general matter. Proving the fact or the quantum of the loss in an individual
case is much more difficult. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.06, cmt. d, at 322; § 5.06, Reporter's Notes,
cmt. d, at 335-37.
94. Id. § 5.06, Reporter's Notes, cmt. a, at 335.
95. Id. § 5.06, at 326.
96. Id. § 5.06, at 326-27.
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does not permit unbridled expectations. The claim is limited in
amount to the difference in income the spouses are expected to have
after dissolution," and is connected to the duration of child care.98
If one accepts the premises of the ALI analysis, the cap on the
quantum of recovery is one that was assumed from the outset.
The ALI acknowledges that a loss of earning capacity as a
benchmark for compensation is inappropriate for some. For many
women, motherhood is considered more important than professional
development. Thus, the ALI formulates her expectation as having
children in the context of an enduring relationship with someone.
The technically accurate measure of compensation would involve
comparing her situation on divorce to what it would have been if she
had married another man. Because that is impractical, the ALI
argues that their proposed measure is at least reasonably
equitable.99
. Arguably, the underlying risks of the burden allocation just
described are assumed to the extent that the couple selects each
other as mates, and to the extent that the decision to have a child
is a matter of choice. But, it could be argued, for example, that the
acceptance of the role of primary caretaker carries with it a risk
which can be characterized as being assumed voluntarily. Might
thisjustify not imposing on the dominant breadwinner an obligation
to pay compensation? The response would seem to be that the
realities of the market place, which place a premium - albeit in
recent years a diminishing one - on a father's participation, suggest
that responsibility for the roles played in a child-producing marriage
should be placed at the door of economic realities external to the
relationship. For this reason, an assumption of risk model can
justifiably be discarded in favor of the ALI's gender free assignment
of risk approach that seems to be more reliably equitable.
A risk assumption model would have difficulties in other
regards as well. One view is, at least historically, women under-
invested in their own education and training in the expectation that
they would have child care responsibilities.'00 To the extent that
this practice continues today, should it be viewed as laying the
foundation for an assumed risk? Or, given the social concern for
recognizing and reinforcing the child-care function, do we identify
the person assuming the risk as the person selecting the under-
invested spouse? Which behavior pattern is it appropriate to
97. Id. § 5.06, at 327.
98. Id. § 5.07, at 338.
99. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.06, at 327.
100. Id. § 5.06, Reporter's Notes, cmt. a, at 337.
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reinforce? There is a practical problem involved here as well. If we
could identify the detriment the claimant suffered by virtue of pre-
marital choices such as under-investing in education, as distinct
from losses arising from post-marital choices, we might assign the
risk of losses associated with the former to the claimant and the
latter to both spouses. 101 In general, though, the calculation cannot
be performed reliably. Accordingly, the ALI takes a pragmatic view.
The totality of the risk of loss is assigned to the couple on an ex post
facto basis to deal with results, namely a child-care function was
performed by someone who emerged from the marriage with a
disadvantaged position. The matter is not really looked at as one of
risk assumption. On the other hand, the ALI proposal does draw
the line. A spouse who withdraws from the labor market for reasons
other than child-care will not be allowed compensatory recovery.
The risks of such a withdrawal are assigned to that spouse subject,
as we saw, to the limitation that as time passes the withdrawing
spouse becomes entitled under the ALI proposal to a compensatory
award premised on the duration of the marriage alone. Time causes
these risks, whatever their source, to be shared.0 2
One aspect of the ALI compensatory payments analysis is
potentially troubling. The measure of recovery is linked to the
claimant's loss in standard of living or earning capacity at the time
of divorce relative to that enjoyed while the marriage continued." 3
The ALI analysis recognizes that, at least in a traditional marriage,
a wife's investment of reproductive capacity, domestic labor, and
support of her husband's career produces benefits for both spouses
in later years. The ALI accepts, however, that these benefits are
largely realized by the time the marriage is twenty to twenty-five
years old. In contrast, it accepts that the husband's investment in
his own earning capacity is potentially able to yield returns beyond
divorce. 1°" This analytical model suggests it may be appropriate to
limit the claimant's recovery to a measure linked to income and
living standards at the time of divorce, notwithstanding the fact
that the obligor's resources and income may continue to increase
after the divorce.0 5 Claimants, however, may not see why the
101. Id. § 5.06, cmt. d, at 324.
102. See supra text accompanying note 85.
103. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.05(1), at 280; § 5.06(1), at 317.
104. Id. § 5.05, Reporter's Notes, cmt. c, at 304-05.
105. The ALI's goal is not income equalization, although this may result in those cases
where the parties have similar incomes during the marriage. See id. § 5.05 cmt. g, at 314-16.
If the parties' aggregate income after divorce is greater than their combined income during
the marriage a goal of income equalization becomes highly suspect. Such a situation may
arise where a party returns to full-time employment after the divorce. Id. at 314. It is also
2002]
262 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 8:243
divorce should generate a discontinuity between the claimant's
contributions and the obligor's potential rewards. °6 Apparently, in
this regard, the ALI model places the risk of lost expectations on the
shoulders of the claimant.'
Even where the basis of the claim is restricted to a post- divorce
divergence in income notionally flowing from a child-care function
performed by the claimant, the ALI is driven to use the financial
disparity between the spouses' incomes as the proxy for the claim-
ant's loss. The claimant does not recover lost earning capacity.'08
Ordinarily, the claimant's recovery will, at most, amount to half the
difference between the two spouses' post-divorce incomes - given
that the magnitude of the recovery will also result from the amount
of time spent on child care. With the passage of time, the risk of
frustrated expectations will ultimately be shared equally. The
claimant's presumed expectations are restricted, however. In
principle, the recovery is limited to a sum that relates to the
incomes the spouses are expected to have immediately after the
dissolution, not at some point in the distant future. °9 Accordingly,
the, claimant cannot look to the enhanced income of the now ex-
spouse as a way of ameliorating what her actual losses from a
diminished earning capacity are, assuming those losses can be
quantified.
The same sort of result follows in those situations where the
claimant establishes a cognizable claim for contributions made to
the other spouse's education. Even though the residual benefit to
the spouse receiving the education triggers the claim, the recovery
still is not linked to the benefit. The argument is made it is not
appropriate to consider the claimant as entitled to a "return" on his
or her "investment" in the other spouse's education. Rather, the
a possibility where incentive based compensation schemes bear fruit after the termination of
the marriage and the scheme's benefits are not otherwise distributable as marital property.
106. The claimant's view may be justified. After all, the ALI does acknowledge that one
rationale for a compensatory award where the claimant has fulfilled a child care function is
that the claimant's efforts enabled the other spouse to have both a family and advance his
career, the benefits of which revert to him alone after the divorce. The ALI view is at least
its approach produces a more balanced allocation of the benefits of the marriage. See id.
§ 5.06, cmt. e, at 328.
107. The ALI proposal hedges its bets somewhat by allowing a departure from a
presumptive award where "substantial injustice" would result. Id. § 5.05(4), at 281; § 5.05(4),
cmt. h, at 299. The examples cited by the ALI suggest that expectations may be relevant, even
though the underlying model does not envision meeting those expectations. Id. cmt. h, illus.
11, at 299-300; Reporter's Notes, cmt. h, at 317.
108. Id. § 5.06, cmt. d, at 327; Reporter's Notes, cmt. a, at 335.
109. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.06, cmt. e, at 327. The ALI proposal, however, does allow for
limited modification of awards in a limited number of situations. Id. § 5.09, at 357.
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financial consequences arise from the marriage. Even if there was
an expectation that the support provider would share in the
enhanced future income stream, it is argued that expectation must
have been paired with an expectation that the couple would still be
married. On this basis, any income sharing would be premised on
the relationship, not the prior financial support.11 ° The provider
essentially assumed the risk of the consequences of the failure of the
relationship, beyond the value of the financial contributions.
Accordingly, the obligation to repay becomes decoupled from the
risks associated with the "performance" of the recipient spouse's
benefit. This, in turn, frees a court from the necessity of making an
anticipatory estimate of the value of the future benefit, as well as of
determining what component of that benefit is a function of the
claimant's contribution and what is due to the recipient's efforts
after the marriage."' These issues become particularly relevant
when one attempts to model a basis for participation in incentive
based compensation schemes.
Where the marriage is of short duration, we saw in limited
circumstances, such as if the claimant had suffered a detriment
which enured to the benefit of the other spouse or was to achieve a
purpose that the spouses agreed was important to their marriage,
the claimant might receive an award."' But the value of the
recovery is limited to half the amount necessary to recover the
premarital standard of living."' The goal here is to assign the risk
equally for a loss which was suffered from the undertaking of a
specific activity, where, by necessary implication, the spouses
assumed the risk of any loss which might result if the marriage
failed, and the causal link between the loss and the activity
undertaken is clear. The remedy is for a specific amount, not a
particular asset, and, thus, ordinarily should be freed from the risks
associated with the obligor's assets or financial future. The ALI,
however, does envision that the award might take the form of an
enhanced share of the marital assets,"' which might then subject
the award to an assessment of the risks associated with the asset's
availability or uncertain value. Where a specific activity recognized
by the ALI proposals does not occur, any relatively disadvantaged
position of the claimant after the marriage is perceived to be a
function of the claimant's disadvantaged financial position prior to
110. Id. § 5.15, Reporter's Notes, cmt. b., at 392-93.
111. See id. at 392.
112. See supra text accompanying note 72.
113. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.16(3), at 394.
114. Id. § 5.17, at 406.
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the marriage, the risks of which remain allocated to the claimant
until such time as the claimant qualifies for one of the compensatory
awards proposed by the ALI. The ALI clearly articulates the view
that "In]ot every risk an individual takes in entering a marriage can
be shifted or shared with the other spouse."1
2. The Risks Associated with Remedial Devices
Under the ALI proposal, marital property is to be divided
equally. In principle, this does not require that the parties be
allocated equal shares of the same asset, only that each -receives
equal value. Initially, this proposal seems reasonable; but, in
application, substantial difficulties arise where the parties own
assets that embody a significant risk factor. Basically, this risk may
exist in two forms. First, there is the risk that the asset's existence
may be subject to contingencies that are not under the parties'
control. If this is true, the only fair way to allocate these assets is
to assign the assets themselves equally between the parties; in this
way, each of the individuals is subject to the same substantive risk.
Moreover, this process eliminates difficulties associated with a
second class of risk, namely the risk associated with uncertain
valuation. Whatever the true value is, the parties will share in it
equally.
The ALI proposal tolerates the allocation of value. To this end,
the ALI points out their plan does not require the parties to receive
property "identical in kind." It does note that if an asset is so large
a portion of the marital estate that it "cannot be offset by other
assets," it may be divided. Whether this is even technically possible
with respect to some of the classes of assets we will be considering
later is open to question. In this regard, the ALI proposes that if the
asset is better left undivided, that asset can be offset by requiring
the recipient to exercise a promissory note in the other spouse's
favor.116 It is not clear, however, how this might be done in contexts
where the contingency of the claim or the uncertainty of the value
would in turn make the face value of the note uncertain. Omi-
nously, allocating value in a way that results in one class of asset in
its entirety being allocated to a particular individual may result in
that party being subjected to all the risks inherent in the asset not
materializing, or materializing at a lesser value than was antici-
115. Id. § 5.16, cmt. b, at 402.
116. Id. § 4.15, cmt. f, at 200.
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pated at the time of distribution.117 Conceptually, this is not, a
totally insurmountable problem if there is a reliable mechanism for
discounting the value to take into account the risks of the party
never owning the asset. This solution, however, is only conceptually
satisfactory. Getting more than a half share of a high risk asset
may be of little solace to an individual if that asset never material-
izes. Of course, again conceptually, if the asset is marketable,
notwithstanding the associated contingencies, the recipient should
theoretically be able to pass on whatever component of the risk with
which he or she feels uncomfortable. Indeed, any share awarded the
party should include an amount to cover the transaction costs
associated with hedging the risk. This might be achieved. by simply
reducing the value assigned to the asset for distribution purposes.
Notable, for our concerns, is the condition that the asset be market-
able.
There is another problem that potentially flows from the
disproportionate allocation of a high-risk asset to one party alone:
such an allocation may cause that party's portfolio of assets to
contain too high a proportion of high-risk assets. Looking at it from
a slightly different perspective, during the marriage a couple might
have been perfectly comfortable having a certain proportion of their
"capital at risk" in a particular asset which itself had particular
risks associated with it. Their risk concerns might be allayed by the
relative stability of the rest of their asset portfolio. But, after the
divorce, an asset distribution based on anticipated value, not
content, might unbalance each of the resulting portfolios," ' unless
an appropriate risk adjustment of the entire portfolio was made," 9
117. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Retained Jurisdiction in Damage Actions Based on
Anticipatory Breach: A Missing Link in Landlord Tenant Law, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 273,
303-04 (1987) (arguing that the discounted value of the future benefit of a stock option may
produce an excessive award if the anticipated benefit does not materialize); see also In re
Marriage of Evans, 426 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ill. 1981). For an example of how an
incentive/handcuff plan can go wrong, see Vanderbeek v. Vanderbeek, 177 Cal. App. 3d 224
(1986). Here, a restricted stock purchase scheme, enabling the employee to purchase certain
stock using a loan from the employer, turned into a crushing liability when the stock price
declined while the loan obligation remained. Id.
118. This is an underlying difficulty in attempting to protect the scope of an option holder's
exposure using a so-called "basket hedge," involving the use of notionally similar performing
instruments, rather than the options themselves being hedged. The individual option value
may decline for reasons not affecting the supposedly similarly performing instruments. See
Schizer, infra note 145, at 451-53.
119. The process of diversifying a portfolio containing options is itself much more complex
than diversifying a portfolio composed of stock alone because of the characteristics of the
process of realizing the value of options and the different tax treatments that apply to the
funds produced in the process. See Elizabeth P. Anderson, Reducing Concentrated Exposure
to Employer Stock, 70 CPA J. 58 (2000).
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taking into account the relative certainty of realization of value or
the underlying risks of distributed assets.2 ° Such a process is
essential if the recipient of the assets in question will face difficul-
ties in realizing the allocated assets and these difficulties are not
otherwise reliably reflected in the value assigned to these assets.'21
Clearly, the ALI proposal is critically dependent on the ability
to reliably assign a value to an asset. In principle, this process can
involve discounting the value to take account of the risk, perhaps to
the extent of the costs of hedging the risk, if such hedging is
technically possible. If this can be done, in essence the recipient of
the asset/value receives it free of risk. The ALI proposal attempts
to take into account the underlying problem by suggesting if the
value of the marital property portion of future payments cannot be
determined at the time of dissolution, the court should fix a share
in the future payments if and when they are received.'22 But, as
was just suggested, any allocation other than on an equal basis
would represent an unbalanced allocation of the risk. The ALI
proposal does envision that if fixing a share is not possible at the
time of dissolution, allocation may be deferred until the uncertain-
ties are resolved.'23 The difficulty here is that if some portion of the
assets is distributed on divorce and some later as events emerge, it
may never be possible to achieve a balanced distribution of the
assets. This would be a particular problem in those situations
where the contingent interests represent a substantial component
of the assets available for distribution.
120. Even without the prospect of a divorce, option holders like to spread their risks. Fifty
one percent of executives holding options cashed in some of them in 1998, with an average
gain of four million dollars. See Pay Survey, THE ECONOMIST, May 8, 1999, at 16.
121. Thus, as market volatility (a critical component in the valuation of options) increases
beyond originally anticipated levels, the holder of a risky asset, must increase other asset
holdings to offset the risk. See Living Dangerously, International Banking Survey, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 1999, at 24-25. This may be particularly relevant where large option
grants were made to attract employees to work for an employer where the employer's risks
of failure are high. Indeed, an adjustment in technology stock prices in the first third of 2000
led to an estimated reduction in the value of options held by the chief executives of some
corporations to be as much as between sixty-eight and one hundred percent. See David
SLeonhardt, Technology Share Plunge Hurting Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,2000, at C1.
Moreover, there is the possibility of a death spiral. If those in charge hold options, there is
an incentive to drive up stock prices. While this may be achieved through increased
profitability, it can also be achieved by reducing the number of shares outstanding. To
achieve this, companies tend to borrow funds to buy back shares, making the company more
vulnerable to failure. See The Trouble With Stock Options, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1999, at
13.
122. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.07(3)(a), at 169.
123. Id. § 4.07(3)(b), at 169; cmt. g, at 180.
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Both of the ALI suggestions for dealing with uncertainty raise
the specter of an obligor spouse interfering with the asset value or
income realization after the divorce. This might dictate in favor of
awarding the obligor a relatively larger share of the contingent
asset to create a disincentive against such disruptive behavior. If
the asset also is subject to contingencies which are not under the
obligor's control, a strategic award designed to control the obligor's
future behavior may work an injustice on the obligor by virtue of
third party behavior. This risk is of particular significance to our
present concerns with incentive based compensation schemes. If the
effect of a court order on divorce is to direct, say, half the benefits of
an employer incentive scheme away from the obligor, the employer
may see the necessity to restructure or replace the scheme in order
to restore the original incentive package. This may occur totally
independently of any efforts on the part of the employee/obligor to
disrupt the court award. Additionally, there clearly exist opportuni-
ties for the employer and the obligor to combine their talents in this
endeavor. We shall return to these themes in the context of dis-
cussing the incentive schemes themselves.
Where the ALI proposal calls for a compensatory award by
Virtue of the duration of the marriage, or the child-care function
performed, the risk issues become even more complex. The award
is one of value and the reference measure is the difference in
incomes the spouses are expected to have after the marriage.124 The
most extreme manifestation of the problem arises when a significant
portion of one spouse's income involves a substantial element of
risk. Two methods are available to respond to this problem.
First, it might be possible to adjust the value of the anticipated
income to accommodate the risk. Whether it is possible to ade-
quately do so both as to the fact of the income and the amount is
questionable. In principle, however, a high negative risk source
would lead to a discount and thus a reduction in the marginal
difference in the incomes of the claimant and the obligor, and
accordingly a lower award. In short, if the theory works, the parties
share the risk. Of course, even this scenario is of small comfort to
the obligor in cases where the income does not materialize at all, but
the obligation to pay, albeit at a reduced level, still exists. Accord-
ingly, this option is truly viable only if the obligor is in a position to
hedge the risk of an income shortfall in the general market.'25 In
124. Id. § 5.05(3); § 5.06(4).
125. Whether such an alternative is viable given contractual, regulatory, and tax
constraints is discussed infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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theory this could be done using the income instrumentality itself, or
other assets of the obligor. The transaction costs of the hedging pro-
cess should further reduce the income gap between the claimant and
the obligor.'26 The claimant too may have some hedging needs, if
the income does not materialize at all or in a sufficient amount, and
the obligor has no alternative resources. Note, however, that the
claimant's risks are fundamentally different. In principle, the
claimant gets an entitlement, the award, which is not source-
specific, but the obligor must meet the obligation from finite
resources.
A second solution to the problem is to allow the award to be
modified after discovering what income was actually produced. The
ALI proposal contains such a possibility of modifying a compensa-
tory award. 27 The risk allocation it envisages is somewhat unbalan-
ced, however. The award may be modified if the financial capacity2 '
of either party is far less than the level upon which the award was
based and the living standards of the obligor or the claimant
therefore are substantially more or less than was contemplated at
the time of the order. Accordingly, if the income does not material-
ize at all, or to the extent anticipated, the obligor could seek a
downward modification of the order, unless - notwithstanding the
income failure - his standard of living does not change. This prin-
ciple requires the claimant to share some of the risks associated
with the income flow. The ALI proposal, however, does not permit
the claimant to seek an increase in the award should the financial
capacity of the obligor increase as the result of a higher than
anticipated income yield.'29 In many situations, the ALI justifica-
tion of this is defensible because, given the nature of the ALI's
proposed compensatory awards, the parties' situations subsequent
to the divorce are essentially irrelevant. Nevertheless, where the
126. Another way of looking at this is that the transaction costs associated with hedging,
which are not insubstantial, reduce the obligor's true pay. See Schizer, infra note 145, at 454.
127. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.09.
128. The ALI notes that a modification should occur only ifthe parties' financial capacities,
and not simply incomes, change. Financial capacity reflects both earning capacity as well as
actual earnings. Additionally, a party's financial capacity may be affected by a change in
assets even though the party's income does not change. See id. § 5.09, cmt. c, at 361. This
article uses the example of income disruption on its own for the sake of simplicity. In fact, the
concept of financial capacity is irrelevant to this paper's concerns because it oftentimes may
be difficult to know with certainty whether the incentive-based compensation package should
be viewed as income or asset or some form of fiscal hybrid.
129. This is clear from the substantive principle that the ALI is proposing. See id. § 5.09,
at 357. The ALI allows an exception if the obligor's financial capacity at the time of the
divorce was less than it had been earlier in the marriage but has increased substantially since
the divorce. Id. § 5.09(1)(c).
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essence of the award concerns the allocation of known high-risk
returns, two alternatives should be considered: (1) no modification
should be allowed on the basis that the award was adjusted at the
outset to accommodate the uncertainties (and other awards
simultaneously may have been made as part of the risk adjust-
ment); or (2) we should accept that initial risk adjustment was not
possible and therefore, in order to share the risks appropriately,
adjustment should be allowed for both over and under yields from
the income sources. The first approach is preferable if the goal is to
achieve certainty, and to avoid the transaction costs associated with
modification. The downside of the approach is that it is unable to
"accommodate compelling changes in the equities."3 ° Moreover, we
should not lose sight of the possibility that the risk assumption
model associated with the couple's original relationship implicitly
involved exposure to long-term risks, for better or worse.
The ALl proposal permits the substitution of an enhanced share
of marital property in place of periodic compensatory awards. 3 ' In
principle, if the assets replacing the compensatory payments carry
the same risks as the risks associated with the anticipated income
sources justifying the compensatory payments then this option
seems unobjectionable. If the risks are disparate, however, the
court has to be extremely confident of the relative value attribution
and income generation potential that are attributed to the assets
assigned to the claimant and those left in the hands of the obligor.
In particular, it must be comfortable with any value adjustment
made to reflect the risk differentials of the two sets of assets.
Finally, the ALl permits restitutionary claims in two circum-
stances.'32 These flow from an investment in the other spouse's
earning capacity or in a short marriage where there is an unfair
disparity in the ability to recover a premarital living standard. In
the first instance the claimant is allowed to recover her contribu-
tions to the obligor's living and education expenses, while in the
latter case the claimant recovers half the amount necessary to
restore his or her premarital standard of living.'33 For our purposes,
the feature to note is that in both cases the award is for a specific
sum which is not linked either in terms of amount or in terms of
payment to contingencies associated with resources in the hands of
the obligor. Even in the case of the educational benefits conferred,
the recovery is a function of costs to the claimant, not potential
130. Id. § 5.09, cmt. a, at 358.
131. Id. § 5.11(2), at 376.
132. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
133. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.15(4), at 384; § 5.16(3), at 394.
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benefits to the obligor.14  In principle, no adjustment for risk is
necessary, because the nature of the award is such that, the
obligor's bankruptcy apart, the claimant ought to receive the
amount risk-free. Even so, risk adjustment is called for in one
regard. The ALI proposal envisions that the payments preferably
be made from an enhanced share of the marital property, or a lump-
sum payment from the obligor's separate property. 131 If either of
these sets of assets have risks associated with them, the value of the
relevant assets should be appropriately discounted to reflect the
risk. If neither of these sources is available, the payment may be
affected through a series of monthly payments of equivalent value.
These monthly payments are not modifiable and therefore the
amount is superficially unaffected by the risks of contingencies. The
ALI does not address whether there should be an adjustment in the
basic amount to reflect possible variations in the risk that the
obligor may not be able to pay as time passes."6 This may be a
sensible approach. True, the divorce provides the claimant with an
absolute entitlement. If the marriage had endured, the recovery of
the benefits through the marriage ordinarily would have been
subject to the same risks. In short, the claimant takes the obligor
and his or her long term risks as the claimant found them.
III. INCENTIVE BASED COMPENSATION SCHEMES
A. The Nature of the Incentive Scheme
A simplistic analysis of the employment relationship would
suggest the more the contract of employment represents a contract
of adhesion, the greater is the likelihood that the compensation
packages will embody rewards linked directly to results produced by
employees. Some examples of this form of compensation are well-
134. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
135. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.17, at 406.
136. The adjustment might occur by attaching an appropriate interest rate to the basic
amount determined to be owing at the date ofjudgment, where the interest rate reflected the
risk-adjusted time value of money. The interest would then be capitalized. This proposal is
certainly consistent with the ALI's requirement that when contributions to educational
expenses are reimbursed, the amount should be adjusted to reflect changes in the time value
of the dollar for the period between when the contribution was made and the divorce. See id.
§ 5.15(4)(c), at 384. It is unclear what the ALI would contemplate in a case where contribu-
tions were made in a currency other than United States dollars. On which party would we,
without hindsight, impose the obligation to cover forward? How does one cover forward with
respect to an amount that may be owed only at an indeterminate time in the future, if at all?
Of course, there will be a point when the marriage has endured for a time sufficient to bar a
recovery for a contribution to education and replace it with a claim to a compensatory award.
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known, including payment for piece work and payment on a
commission-only basis. For our purposes, these modes of compensa-
tion have certain features of interest. First, it is known precisely
when the work triggering a particular reward 'was performed.
Second, we know what the employee's compensation will be if the
employee's own efforts bear fruit. Developments in recent years in
the American labor market have produced a new phenomenon. In
certain industries, it is the employees themselves who are insisting
on essentially incentive-based compensation schemes in the form of
stock options. In other industries, employees are insisting on an
alternative manifestation of what also is perceived to be an
incentive driven scheme - namely, granting to the employees the
stock itself.'37
A stock option gives the employee the right to purchase stock of
the employer at a predetermined price.'38 The price is usually fixed
at the then prevailing market price,'39 in circumstances where it is
envisaged that the price will rise, so the ultimate benefit to the
employee will. be the difference between the price at which the
137. See generally David Leonhardt, In the Options Age, Rising Pay (and Risk): Order of
Compensation Universe Reflects Pull of New Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, § 3, at 1.
138. JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, VENTURE CAPITAL 226 (1988).
139. Stock options fall into two general classes based primarily on their conceptualization
for tax treatment purposes. If they receive "preferred" tax treatment they are Incentive Stock
Options (ISO) under the Internal Revenue Code § 422. To avoid triggering a "taxable event"
when the option is granted, the exercise price must be the "fair market value" of the stock at
the time the option is granted, among a number of other stringent conditions. BARTLETT,
supra note 138, at 227-28; I.R.C. § 422(b). If the qualifying conditions are not met, the options
are classed as Non-Qualified Stock Options (NSO). Of significance is the fact the holder of an
ISO can defer taxation of the shares, and then do so on a preferred capital gains basis when
the shares acquired through exercising the option are actually sold, if the stock acquired is
held for a qualifying period before sale. The holder of an ISO pays tax on the difference
between the basis (essentially the option's exercise price) and the value of the stock at the
time the stock is sold. See BARTLETT, supra note 138, at 230; Webster & de Lisser, supra note
3, at 149. In principle, an NSO may be taxed at the time the option is granted. This is
advantageous because any subsequent appreciation in the stock can be subjected to capital
gains treatment. This treatment, however, requires that the option have a readily ascertain-
able fair market value at the time of the grant. It may be difficult to meet this requirement
for many reasons, not the least of which is the option's transfer and vesting restrictions. See
Webster & de Lisser, supra note 3, at 147. In this event, when exercised, the option will
trigger taxation as ordinary income on the difference between the exercise price of the option
and the fair market value of the underlying stock. When the stock acquired through
exercising the option is sold, appreciation after the option exercise date is taxed on a capital
gains basis, possibly even a short-term capital gain basis if the holder sells the stock within
a year of acquiring it. Id.; Rehfeldt v. Rehfeldt, Appeal No. C-850056, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS
5603, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1986); see also Schizer, infra note 145, at 466-69. Because
the option holder may be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) under I.R.C. §
56(b)(3), the tax benefits of an ISO may not be as great as the basic treatment first suggests.
Schizer, infra note 145, at 467. For some strategies for dealing with the AMT, see
Trumbower, supra note 5, at 174-77.
272 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 8:243
option is to be exercised and the market price at which the employee
is able to sell the stock after exercising the option. The employee is
freed from risk to the extent that if the stock price does not rise, the
employee has not paid out anything, and does not have to do so. To
the extent that the option represents compensation for labor
performed or to be performed, a decline in the price of the stock will
leave the holder of the option uncompensated. In this sense the
option is not risk free.
Normally, the employee may not exercise the option before a
specified period has elapsed, and then only if the employee remains
in the employment of the employer. The option is commonly said to
vest when both these conditions have been met.140 Technically, it
may be necessary to recognize four situations. The option may be
vested (sometimes described as accrued) and matured, that is the
employee will have an absolute right to exercise the option immedi-
ately. Then, the option may be vested but not matured, that is the
employee has an absolute right to exercise the option at some future
date, but cannot currently do so. Third, the option is matured, or
can be exercised but not vested; conventionally, the stock will be
received unconditionally only if the option holder remains in
employment at a date in the future. 141 Finally, if the option can be
exercised in the future only, and the privilege of exercising it may
be lost in the interim, the option is described as unvested 4 1
Jurisdictions are not always careful in the use of the terminology,
14 3
and generally, unless the context otherwise indicates, we will treat
the option as unvested if it is subject to the risk of forfeiture.
Ordinarily, the employee is free to exercise the option only for a
specified period.44
140. The concept of"vesting" may differ in the context of pensions and tax law. See In re
Marriage of Miller, 915 P.2d 1314, 1318 n.3 (Colo. 1996); Thomas P. Malone, Employee Stock
Options and Restricted Shares: Determining and Dividing the Marital Pot, 25 COLO. LAW. 87,
88 (Oct. 1996).
141. This type of arrangement really involves a hybrid scheme, part option, part restricted
stock.
142. See Davidson v. Davidson, 578 N.W.2d 848, 853-54 (1998). See generally Laurence J.
Cutler & Samuel V. Schoonmaker, IV, Division and Valuation of Speculative Assets: Reasoned
Adjudication or Courthouse Confusion?, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 257,284-96 (1998);
J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, § 7.11[3][a]
(1999).
143. See Hall v. Hall, 363 S.E.2d 189, 195-96 (N.C. App. 1987). Even when the case is
settled, confusion may remain. See Taylor v. Taylor, 752 A.2d 1113 (Conn. App. 2000)
(holding that the term "vested" in a settlement agreement applied to options that were
exercisable as well as those not yet exercisable).
144. In the case of an ISO, this period is no longer than ten years. I.R.C. § 422. The plan
may impose a shorter period.
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A rudimentary analysis suggests that the option is intended to
do two things. First, because the recipient must remain an employee
for a minimum period in order to exercise the option, the option is
a device aimed at ensuring the employee remains in the service of
the employer for at least a minimum period. Second, the device
creates an incentive for the employee to do whatever he or she can
to enhance the price of the stock, so as to increase the spread
between the price at which the employee is free to exercise the
option and the price that the employee is able to get for the
resulting stock on the open market. In concept, the device creates
a unity of interest between employees and the employer's stockhold-
ers. This is known as "incentive compatibility." 4 '
Despite the forward-looking elements associated with options,
the option itself may be awarded for prior services. This may be a
significant feature when it comes to determining the portion of the
145. Thus, in one case the stock plan provided: "the purpose of the Plan is to give the
Company a significant advantage in attracting, retaining, and motivating key employees and
to provide the Company with the ability to provide incentives more directly linked to the
profitability of the Company's businesses and increases in stockholder value." Peterson v.
Peterson, No. CA99-01-007, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5121, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1999).
The unity between stockholders and employee option holders may be transitory. The effect
of exercising the option is to increase the number of shares in circulation, which dilutes the
existing stockholders' interest. See David Leonhardt, In the Options Age, Rising Pay (and
Risk): Will Today's Huge Rewards Devour Tomorrow's Earnings?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000,
§ 3, at 1. Indeed, the unity of interest may be only illusory, even before the option holder
exercises the option. It may be possible for the option holder to simulate the sale of the option
using the derivatives market. In addition, the option holders' and stockholders' risk
exposures are not symmetrical because at one level of analysis, an option holder has no
downside risk. See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440,443-44,453 (2000). Some senior executive
option holders may be precluded by law from hedging in some circumstances, and tax laws
create a disincentive to do so for many option holders. Id. at 444. Schizer concludes that
except where a broad contractual prohibition is in place, regulatory constraints on hedging
may be limited if the holder does not qualify as an "insider," and even in this case, the controls
may be bypassed by using broad-based hedges rather than a hedge closely tied to the
employer's operations. Id. at 460-66. Nevertheless, the tax constraints on hedging may be
substantial, and it is not just "insiders" who will be impacted. Where the underlying income
source is an option, the prevailing tax treatment makes effective hedging prohibitively
expensive in many instances. Id. at 474-91. One of the major sources of difficulty is that the
beneficiary of the incentive-based scheme receives the benefit as compensation, which for tax
policy reasons is treated differently than benefits and losses on investments. Ordinarily,
hedging strategies will be viewed as implicating an investment treatment. Id. Generally,
stock owned by an individual and purchased with his or her own funds will not be subject to
hedging penalties by the tax system. Id. at 491-92. Unfortunately, however, where restricted
stock is received as compensation, efforts to hedge the value of the grant may be subjected to
essentially the same adverse tax treatment as is encountered with options. Id. at 492-94. In
certain instances, it may be possible to engineer a hedge arrangement that does not trigger
such unfavorable tax treatment. Id. at 484-91, 493-94.
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option's value that is distributable as marital property, a topic to
which we will return.
A stock option is not without limiting considerations. First, as
noted, the employee has to remain in the employer's employment.
The option instrument may effectively leave the employer free to
terminate the employment relationship, and thus deprive the
employee of any potential benefits of the option, or the employer
may have a limited right to do so. Not infrequently, the employer
also is free to cancel the scheme at any time before the employee
exercises the option. Even if the employee is in a position to
exercise the option, however, there may be constraints on the
employee's doing so. If the underlying stock is publicly traded, the
employee may be precluded from publicly disposing of the stock
acquired by exercising the option for a minimum period of time after
acquisition under rules primarily targeted at regulating the
behavior of "insiders."'46 Tax laws may impose similar con-
straints. 4 v Additionally, the grantor of the options may limit the
ability to trade the stock for a period after acquisition for the
purposes of controlling market liquidity and, hence, the price of the
stock in general. 48 Finally, depending on whether the stock option
scheme is one meeting standards established under the Internal
Revenue Code, transactions may be subjected to various tax treat-
ments which may be advantageous or treacherous.'49
On its face a stock option is prospective in character. Neverthe-
less, it is quite possible for an employee to be awarded stock options
for work that has already been performed. In such a context, the
link between value of the compensation received and the employee's
historic performance is conceptually tenuous although a link to the
employee's current performance still exists because the recipient
has to retain the status of employee for the necessary period to
146. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2001). Certain instruments offered to employees may be subject
to shorter restriction periods than those required under Rule 144. See BARTLETT, supra note
138, § 7.11, at 28-30 (cumul. supp. 1990).
147. In the case of an ISO, the option holder may not dispose of stock received under the
option scheme earlier than two years from the date the option was granted and one year after
the option was exercised. See I.R.C. § 422(a)(1) (2001); Webster & de Lisser, supra note 3, at
149. This rule means that an ISO package cannot be hedged. See also Schizer, supra note
145, at 484 n.171.
148. See Lomen v. Lomen, 433 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that employee
agreed all shares purchased under the option agreement would be acquired for investment
and not for resale).
149. BARTLETT, supra note 138, at 230-32. For a general discussion of the tax treatment
of stock options including for income, estate, gift, and charitable giving tax purposes, see
Richard J. Petrucci, Jr., Planning With Employee Stock Options, 51 CBA EST. & PROB. NEWSL.
5 (1999).
exercise the option. Where the option is awarded as compensation
for future endeavors, as we saw, notionally the concept is it is the
employee's endeavors that will contribute to the option's value. In
reality, however, the value may well be a function of market forces
and/or the employer's unrelated activities. 5 ° Again, as in the
instance where the option is awarded for historical efforts, the
ultimate value of the compensation will be a function of time and
circumstance.
Ordinarily, a stock option only has appeal in contexts where the
stock value is likely to appreciate significantly because the benefit
to the recipient is the marginal difference between the market price
of the stock and the exercise price of the option. Where the stock
price is relatively stable or even declining slightly, employers have
another weapon in their compensation arsenal, namely, the ability
to issue restricted stock.'' The employer in this case issues stock
to the employee at a discount price and subject to certain limita-
tions. First, the stock is issued to the employee subject to the
condition that the company has the right to buy back the stock at
the employee's nominal cost should the employee leave prematurely.
This restriction is often lifted with the passage of time, that is, the
stock is said to "vest." The employee is absolutely precluded from
alienating the stock until it vests.'52 From the employer's point of
view, the scheme's structure serves two purposes. First, the
150. See In re Marriage of Short, 859 P.2d 636, 644-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). The source
of the enhancement of value may be of significance in some jurisdictions. Thus, if the asset
in dispute came into the marriage as non-marital property, where any appreciation is
"passive" - not due to the active contribution of the title holder - the appreciation remains
separate property, but the appreciation will be considered for distribution purposes where the
non-titled spouse can be said to have made a contribution. Conversely, if the asset is marital
property, then "passive" appreciation can be attributed to both spouses. See, e.g., Bepler v.
Bepler, FA 960154815S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2627 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 1998)
(holding the appreciation of nine million dollars in restricted stock owned by the employee
spouse had occurred in the two years between the inception of the divorce proceedings and the
date of the decree was "passive," due to the overall increase in the stock market, and therefore
was distributable marital property).
151. David Leonhardt, In the Options Age, Rising Pay (and Risk): Order of Compensation
Universe Reflects Pull of New Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, § 3, at 12 (indicating that
"old economy" stocks were issuing restricted stock as compensation because these companies
were unable to issue options with the same appreciation potential as the stock of companies
in the "new economy").
152. BARTLETT, supra note 138, at 78. For our purposes, a question arises as to whether
an attempt to transfer an interest pursuant to divorce proceedings is a violation of, or may be
thwarted by, such a prohibition against alienation. For an example of this problem in a
context where the employer held a right of first refusal to purchase shares which the employee
proposed to transfer to his wife as part of divorce settlement, see Monitor Technology v.
Hetrick, 76 Cal. App. 3d 912 (1978). The matter here was further complicated because the
shares were not publicly traded.
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employee is motivated to enhance the market value of the stock.
Second, the employee is required to remain an employee in order to
reap the benefit. From the employee's point of view, the compensa-
tion is reflected in the value of the stock above the discount price,
plus any further appreciation." Unlike a stock option, once the
qualifying conditions are satisfied the employee receives a benefit
even if the stock price has not climbed. Basically, the associated
negative risks ire those of not meeting the qualifying conditions for
the stock to vest or the risk of a market downturn. On the plus side,
there is the possibility of an appreciation in value."M With re-
stricted stock the employee is at greater risk than with an option
scheme. Unlike options, the employee has an investment in the
stock, albeit at a discounted price. This is significant for our
purposes because the investment of the couple, independent of the
employee spouse's labor, is more readily apparent.155 This might be
significant when "value" contributed during the marriage is sought
to be recaptured at the time of divorce. In this context, the marital
contribution might also be reflected in investments in other assets
designed to hedge against the consequences of any market down-
turn. Because compensation in the form of stock options, unlike
restricted stock, does not involve a direct investment by the
employee other than in the form of his or her labor, the need for
such a hedging strategy would not be as compelling where the
employee receives options rather than restricted stock.
153. Under I.R.C. § 83(b), the employee recipient of the restricted stock is given the ability
to pay tax on the difference between the discounted price and the fair value of the stock at the
time the stock is issued to the employee, that is, assuming the stock will appreciate with time,
when the taxable spread is at the lowest possible. Subsequent appreciation is taxed on a
capital gains basis. This is potentially a significant benefit to the employee and one which is
not available to the recipient of stock options, even ISOs. See BARTLETT, supra note 138, at
79; Schizer, supra note 145, at 494.
154. It should be mentioned we are not presently concerned with what are known as
Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPS"). These plans permit an employee and an
employer to make contributions to a trust which holds stock in the employer for the benefit
of the employee. In what is probably the most common manifestation, the trust forms the
corpus of an employee pension. See generally 4 WILLIAM M. LIEBER, LIEBER ON PENSIONS ch.
14 (1996). There is clearly an incentive for the employee to add value to the employer's stock.
To the extent that an ESOP is an intrinsic part of an employee pension scheme, it is regulated
by the laws governing pensions and the associated tax treatment. One element of these
regulations frees the employee, aged at least fifty-five and after ten years of employment, to
diversify the portfolio, thus distributing the risk beyond the boundary of the employer's gates.
Id. at 14-136-14-155. For a variety of materials dealing with ESOPS, see BARTLETT, supra
note 138, at 131 n.96.
155. In the simplest manifestation of restricted stock offerings the employee actually pays
for the stock at the outset, or agrees to pay for the stock in the future. In the more complex
schemes, the obligation to pay progressively may be forgiven by the employer in return for
future endeavors. Either way, the contribution of the "marriage" is readily identifiable.
ALIPROPOSALS
While it might appear that an employee holding stock options
or restricted stock in the employer may have limited opportunity to
hedge the risks associated with those instruments, risk distribution
may be available to a sophisticated employee. First, an employee
absolutely entitled to exercise an option may be allowed to sell the
option without exercising it, unless the condition of the grant
precludes such a sale. Even if the option or stock instrument which
the employee holds, or the tax or securities laws, preclude dealing
with the instrument, the employee may be able to trade in "surro-
gates," that is instruments, be they stock or options, which track the
performance of the employee's own instruments in a more or less
predictable manner.'56 In short, it might be possible for an em-
ployee to preserve the "value" in the instrument he or she is holding
even without the ability to control the instrument. Such a process,
however, certainly is not without transaction costs or risk.5 7 These
concerns become particularly relevant to the issues we are consider-
ing in those circumstances where an employee, as part of a divorce
process, is forced to relinquish known "value" at the time of divorce
in return for a share of potential, and arguably more or less
hypothetical, value to be realized in the future. This article will
return to this theme.
B. The Claimant's Access to the Incentive Scheme
As was seen earlier, using the ALI analysis, a claimant has
three routes that might lay the foundation for a claim to an
incentive based compensation scheme or its proceeds. First, the
assertion might be the scheme represents marital property. Second,
the claimant may assert the compensation scheme constitutes a
portion or all of the other spouse's income and, as such, should be
156. See Share and Share Unalike, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1999, at 20 (describing survey
finding increasing use of derivatives to escape constraints on dealing in their employer's
options). Basically, the employee looking for a surrogate can use a so-called "synthetic," a
stock that mimics his or her own, whose earnings are related to factors affecting the held
stock's performance or, use may be made of market indices or something similar that tracks
the employer's operations. This strategy is sometimes called "basket hedging." See Schizer,
supra note 145, at 451-52. As alluded to earlier, tax law or administrative or remedial
constraints may prevent the option holder from adopting these strategies. See id.
157. Apart from the risk intrinsic to the hedging itself, an employer might take a dim view
of the option holder seeking to decouple himself or herself from the employer's interests, and
the market itself might become apprehensive about investing in a concern where presumably
informed sources found the need to hedge their interests. See Schizer, supra note 145, at 458.
Of course, the option holder may try to keep the hedging secret, because the technical duty
to disclose, absent contractual obligations, may be restricted to "insiders" as defined by the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a). See id. at 460-62.
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considered in calculating the parties' income differential for the
purpose of a compensatory award. Third, the argument would be
the scheme represents an item of value which could be used to
satisfy claims based on contributions to the other spouse's educa-
tion, or for the restoration of a premarital standard of living after a
short marriage. A discussion of the first route will address the
issues relevant to the second and third routes as well.
1. Property Distribution
a. Does the Incentive Based Scheme Constitute Property?
Where the claimant seeks a recovery on the basis that the item
constitutes marital property, the first hurdle that needs to be
overcome is to establish that the incentive based scheme constitutes
"property." This question arises in two respects.
Initially, there is the question of whether the contingencies
associated with the scheme render it a mere "expectancy," and thus
not distributable as property.15 At the outset, notice the contingen-
cies associated with incentive based compensation schemes
essentially fall into two groups. One group of conditions will affect
the employee's entitlement to the benefits of the scheme. These
conditions include potential loss through resigning from employ-
ment prior to becoming absolutely entitled to the benefit, being
dismissed for cause, or the employer's cancellation of the scheme for
whatever reason. The other set of conditions will affect the value of
the benefit. These concerns might cover the ultimate market price
of the stock, restrictions on alienation imposed by the grantor or
securities regulators, or the tax treatment required or able to be
employed by the beneficiary of the scheme. Our present concerns
are primarily with the former set of conditions,'59 although some
158. The fact that an item is apparently valueless does not in itself mean that it is not
distributable property. See Banning v. Banning, No. 95 CA 79, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2693
at *14, *20 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 1996) (holding the trial court erred in refusing to
distribute stock option because the exercise price was above the market price of the
underlying stock).
159. Courts have combined both sets of considerations in determining that a particular
scheme amounts to an expectancy. See Ross v. Ross, 600 A.2d 891, 894-95 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1992) (finding a preemptive right to buy stock was a mere expectancy and thus not
marital property, because the owner could not be compelled to sell and because the purchase
price could not be determined in advance of the purchase). Other courts make it clear that
uncertainties as to value are irrelevant to the determination that an option is distributable
property. See, e.g., Charriere v. Charriere, No. 05-97-00434-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 7475,
at *10-12 (Tex, App. Oct. 7, 1999). Interestingly, because under the ALI proposals
compensatory awards are premised on the realization of value without requiring an
ALIPROPOSALS
courts find themselves overwhelmed by the cumulative effects of
both sets."8
Most jurisdictions have taken the position that mere expectan-
cies, such as an anticipated inheritance, are not distributable on
divorce. Normally, the testator is free to change his or her mind and
this risk renders distribution on divorce inappropriate. This is well
spaded soil in the area of pension schemes where the concern is
whether an "unvested" pension, where the employee will receive
nothing if the employee fails to satisfy some initial conditions -
usually involving remaining in employment for a minimum period
of time - is distributable. The vast majority of jurisdictions in the
United States today take the position that non-vested pensions are
distributable, on the theory that, unlike expected inheritances, the
grantor of the employment benefit is not free to change his mind
and eliminate the inchoate benefit.16' Of course, the employer and
the employee are free to terminate the employment relationship
that indirectly will result in the loss of any pension benefit. But, in
the context of pensions, jurisdictions have developed a variety of
techniques for dealing with this class of problem. Some simply defer
the divorce related distribution until the uncertainties are resolved.
Others assign a share to the non-employee spouse on a "when and
if" basis. The effect of such an order is to make the non-employee
spouse shoulder a proportional share of future risks, which, as has
been pointed out, should not be unappealing if the alternative is
non-participation in the benefit at all.'62 Finally, others attempt to
estimate the risk of the pension never vesting, and take this into
account as part of the process of assigning a value to the pension.
Given the pension experience, the trend among jurisdictions in the
United States is to treat unvested stock options as property on the
basis that the employee has a contractual right that has value as
intangible property.'"
underlying characterization of the option grant as property, the ALI proposal may provide a
device for a claimant to gain access to the benefits of the options even if the scheme is
characterized as a mere "expectancy." In such a context the claimant becomes linked to the
risks associated with the value realization rather than asset realization, which, depending on
the jurisdictions treatment, may be a significant distinction.
160. See Brandon v. Brandon, No. 01-A-01-9805-CV-00235, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 271,
at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1999) (holding option subject to contingencies of serial
vesting after marriage ended with the resulting uncertain value and uncertainties relating
to the decision to exercise the option rendered the benefit too contingent and speculative to
be considered marital property).
161. See, e.g., Krafick v. Krafick, 663 A.2d 365, 372 (Conn. 1995).
162. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Step By Step: The Development of the Distributive
Consequences of Divorce in North Carolina, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2017, 2132, 2134, 2136 (1998).
163. See Bornemann v. Bornemann, 752 A.2d 978, 986 (Conn. 1998). This case lists a
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In the context of incentive based compensation schemes, the use
of the various techniques with respect to pensions is, by and large,
acceptable as long as the techniques are applied in a disciplined
manner. Deferring resolution of the issue," or assigning a portion
of the asset,"5 tends to lead the court to allocate the underlying risk
in isolation. For example, if the portion allocated to a claimant
involves a share that is not equal to the other spouse's share
because the other spouse is to receive some other class of asset, then
there is a substantial risk of resulting inequity because the risks
associated with the different classes of asset may be different.166 If
we try to avoid these concerns by employing an appropriate
distribution in-kind, the result may be the need for the now ex-
spouses to maintain an on-going financial relationship which some
jurisdictions, for good reason, find objectionable, 167 even to the point
number of other jurisdictions coming to the same conclusion, as well as some states which
have decided to the contrary. Id. at 986 n.4. For example, Colorado treats an option as a non-
vested expectancy where the employee has not completed the minimum employment term to
be entitled to receive the benefit, but as vested property an option where the minimum term
is completed, even if the if the option does not have a readily ascertainable value and even if
the option is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. See In re Marriage of Huston, 967 P.2d
181, 183 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that only vested stock options are property).
164. See Isaacs v. Isaacs, 632 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
165. See In re Marriage of Frederick, 578 N.E.2d 612, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
166. This problem was briefly alluded to earlier in this article. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text. A few courts are aware of the problem. See In re Marriage of Frederick,
578 N.E.2d at 619 ("There is no indication in the record... that the apportionment of marital
property was affected in any manner by the determination to allocate the profits [from the
options] equally between the parties."). Some courts adopt an incredibly simplistic approach:
"Employee stock options are normally exercisable on the condition that the employee remain
with the employer and, as between the spouses, that is obviously within the control of the
employee spouse." In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal. App. 3d 780, 794 (1984). 'Even if the non-
employee spouse cannot control the employment relationship, that does not mean that the
employee spouse necessarily can. The issue is how to assign the risks associated with that
missing element of control. In Wendt v. Wendt, FA 960149562S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS
3104 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997), the husband was employed by General Electric Corp. (GE). The
court identified the following risks associated with some 420,000 unvested options and
appreciation rights held by the husband: 1) the husband would not be employed by GE at the
date of vesting and the options would thus have no value, 2) the husband would not be
employed by GE at the date of vesting and would not have been offered a "separation package"
which included the vesting of some portion of the options and thus the options would have no
value, 3) the husband was offered a "separation package" under which the options which were
allowed to vest did not include any which constituted marital property (as the court put it,
they had a coverture factor of zero), 4) the husband was not offered a "separation package,"
but his new employer offered a signing bonus such that while the options became valueless,
the husband received the equivalent sum from his new employer, 5) GE amended, suspended
or terminated the option plans either individually or company wide, 6) the price of the
underlying GE stock fell below the value it had on the date the parties separated which was
the value the court proposed to use, in distribution based on the "intrinsic value" of the option.
Id. at *22-23, *25-26. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, FA 960149562S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3104, at *26
2002] ALI PROPOSALS 281
of overriding an offer by the claimant to run the risks associated
with the options.'68 In theory, this problem may be circumvented if
it is possible to adjust the value of the various classes of asset to
reflect the different risks associated with the ability to realize the
value of each class, and then assign each spouse appropriately
valued but different and discrete assets. The realities may be
different. Generally, an employer is not free to unilaterally revoke
a pension benefit, albeit one that has not vested. The same cannot
be said for many of the incentive based schemes with which we are
presently concerned.169 In principle, one simply cannot give one
spouse a portion of a pension and the other a portion of a stock
option without acknowledging that the risks associated with the
realization of these assets are different. Notice at this point we are
concerned with the contingencies which impact the ability to get
access to the value, not with the contingencies which affect the
value itself, even though the former set of contingencies ultimately
may affect the value to the claimant. As far as the value itself is
concerned, if the value assigned to the asset is accurate, it will
adequately reflect risks associated with the realization of the
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1997); Isaacs v. Isaacs, 632 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994);
Rehfeldt v Rehfeldt, Appeal No. C-850056, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5603, at *18 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 12,1986). In contrast, in Chen v. Chen, 416 N.W.2d 661,664-65 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), the
court set up a complex scheme allowing the employee spouse to decide when to exercise the
option and when to sell the resulting stock, but also enabled the other, now former, spouse to
insist on receiving specific value for her share if the resulting stock was not sold within a
specified time of the option being exercised. In In re Marriage of Smith, 682 S.W.2d 834, 836-
37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), the court recognized the desirability of severing the parties interests,
but determined that there were "sound economic reasons" why severance was not feasible or
advisable and left the parties with the trial court's plan under which the parties each received
a fifty percent share of the scheme. If the husband wished to exercise an option he had to give
the wife thirty days notice to provide him with the necessary cash for her share, failing which
she forfeited her rights. Under the circumstances it was felt acceptable to leave the parties
as "tenants in common." Id. at 837.
168. See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, FA 960149562S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3104, at *26
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1997) ("Long term and deferred sharing of financial interests are
obviously too susceptible to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts
traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent possible.").
169. Not only may the option not survive termination, but its benefits may be lost to
company restructuring, or even by way of a "claw-back" provision under which an employee
is liable to the employer for the profits realized through an option scheme if the employee
joins a competitor. See IBM Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999) (options are
contract rights and not covered by state law barring an employer from recovering wages);
Ellen L. Rosen, Stock Options; Ex-Employees are Suing Over Promises Made, 91 N.Y. L.J. 5
(2000). Apparently, employers are becoming increasingly aggressive in inserting and
enforcing forfeiture provisions. See Carolyn T. Geer, Beware the "Clawback"..., FORTUNE,
Apr. 17, 2000, at 514.
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value. 7 ' We shall return to matters associated with assigning value
in due course.
Given the possibly substantial uncertainties associated with
realizing the benefits of an incentive-based scheme, a court may be
tempted to decline to recognize the benefits of such schemes as
being distributable property.17" ' The cases 7 2 suggest, however, that
this is not occurring, possibly because the pension scheme analog
appears deceptively similar.17 3
b. Does the Scheme Constitute Property or Income?
The second sense in which it is necessary to consider whether
these incentive based compensation schemes constitute property
available for marital distribution relates to whether a better, or
more appropriate, characterization of the benefit is as "income" to
be used in fixing and meeting the obligations reflected in compensa-
tory awards.'74 Certainly, if the stock option has been exercised and
170. Technically, this assigned value might reflect a discount arising from the transaction
costs associated with the hedging necessary to ensure the assigned value is achieved.
171. Hutto v. Hutto, No. CA 92-51, 1992 Ark. App. LEXIS 523, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. July 8,
1992). The company could revoke the option if the employee failed to exercise the option
within three months of leaving the company's employ, if the employee was terminated for acts
"inimical" to the best interests of the company, or if the employee's responsibilities were
altered to a level that would not have initially warranted the grant of the option. Id. at *2.
The court held the employee's rights to exercise the option were uncertain and accordingly
that the option could only be classified as a "contingent expectancy". Id. at *5. Indiana takes
essentially the same view if the option is not vested, that is if the right to exercise the option
would be forfeited if the employment is terminated. Hann v. Hann, 655 N.E.2d 566, 571 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995).
172. For an incomplete compilation of cases covering matters related to stock options, see
Eric Hollowell, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Treatment of Stock Options for Purposes
of Dividing Marital Property, 46 A.L.R. 4th 640 (2000).
173. In re Marriage of Nelson, 222 Cal. Rptr. 790, 792-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In Hann v.
Hann, Indiana used a pension analogy to go in the other direction. Under Indiana law a
pension which is subject to forfeiture if employment is terminated is not distributable marital
property. Hann, 655 N.E.2d at 570.
174. Seither v. Seither, No. 98-02590, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 16816, at *5 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Dec. 15, 1999):
The difficulty with stock options... is that they have a dual nature. They have
characteristics of an asset in that they represent a right to purchase an owner-
ship share in the underlying corporation's stock.... [T]hey have characteristics
of income in that the whole purpose behind options is to allow the owner to
capture the appreciation in value of the stock prior to its actual purchase....
Also, they are often given as a form of compensation.
The same analysis must be made when determining the employee's income for the purpose
of calculating child support. See Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d 288, 292-95 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999) (deciding that options given every year and exercisable after twelve months for up to
ten years were income). This characterization problem has already caught the attention of
the general media. See Amy Zipkin, Stock Option Splitsville, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2000, at C1.
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the shares are received and freely marketable by the employee, or
if the employee is now holding restricted stock free from the risks of
forfeiture.17 If the benefits received were not otherwise consumed
during the marriage, there does not seem to be an objection to treat-
ing the results of these schemes as property available for distribu-
tion if the benefits otherwise qualify as marital property. But, if the
situation is not as just described, compelling arguments can be
made that these benefits could, query should, be viewed as income.
After all, the employee is granted the option or the restricted
stock176 as compensation.'77 Or, put another way, the employee -
and presumably his or her spouse - agrees to forego salary in order
to be paid in options. 78 Indeed, in a noticeable number of instances,
such schemes may constitute a significant portion of the employee's
compensation."'
There are three possible scenarios to be considered. First, the
grant may be made for services totally rendered during the mar-
riage.18 In this event the benefit should be treated as marital
property.' 81 But care must be taken. Because the receipt of the
value may occur after the marriage, the claimant should not be
allowed to recover a share of the scheme as marital property while
at the same time the receipt of the value by the employee is treated
175. Indeed, it has been held where a grant of restricted stock during the marriage carried
with it the ability to exercise rights of ownership such as to vote and receive dividends, and
where the employer could not unilaterally repudiate the employee's right to retain the stock,
even if the stock was subject to the risk of forfeiture by reason of leaving employment within
five years after the grant, the stock could be treated as marital property. In re Marriage of
Miller, 915 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Colo. 1996). The risk of forfeiture was seen as affecting the value
of the restricted stock, not their nature as marital property. Id. at 1320. Depending on the
conditions triggering forfeiture, this may not be a universal truth. See Charriere v. Charriere,
7 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Tex. App. 1999).
176. For a case where the employee spouse claimed that stock were routinely cashed out
to generate income, see In re Marriage of Huston, 967 P.2d 181, 185 (Colo. App. 1998).
177. See In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal. App. 3d 780, 785 (1984) (citing 5 FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 2136, 2143.1 (rev. ed. 1976)).
178. Hann v. Hann, 655 N.E.2d 566, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (Chezem, J., dissenting);
DeJesus v. DeJesus, 987 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (N.Y. 1997).
179. Keffv. Keff, 757 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
'180. The question for our purposes of when the marriage ended is not one to be taken
lightly. The question is beyond the scope of the present paper save for noting that courts are
aware of the need to take care lest the traditional date for valuing assets might lead to a
claimant getting an unjustified benefit, especially where a lengthy period elapses between the
breakdown of the marriage and the finalization of the divorce and the asset appreciates due
to the effort of the employee spouse. See Soule v. Soule, 676 N.Y.S.2d 701,704 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998). The appreciated value, however, may still be relevant if the appreciated option is being
looked to as a source of income for making a compensatory award.
181. Some states may preclude this where the options are not exercisable during the
marriage. See Hann, 655 N.E.2d at 571.
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as income for the purposes of assessing a compensatory award.1
2
Of course, once the asset has been received, the asset itself may
produce income that can be counted for compensatory purposes.
This would apply equally to the employee and the claimant spouse.
It is extremely important to note that even in the simple scenario
just described, because the value will be received perhaps both after
the marriage and considerably later than when it was "earned," and
because each incentive based compensation package potentially
carries with it its own "risk environment," regarding both realiza-
tion and value,"s each package needs to be independently dealt with
in this way. That is, one should not assign to one spouse a given
incentive package in its entirety with a view to satisfying that
spouse's property and income claims, and correspondingly assign
the other spouse the total benefit of another package. Ideally,
distributable shares of an incentive package only should be assigned
in the same proportions, rather than giving one claimant a dispro-
portionate share of one package, and enhancing the other spouse's
share of another incentive scheme. The same concerns apply when
marital property includes both incentive-based compensation
packages and other property." 4 True, it might be possible to adjust
182. In the context of pensions, see Majauskas v Mqauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481,492-93 (1984).
See also Chen v. Chen, 415 N.W.2d 661, 664-65 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the value
of stock options were correctly treated as non-income for the purposes of fixing maintenance).
183. For example, grants of options and grants of shares may end up being subjected to
different tax treatments, with a significant impact on the realizable value. Davidson v.
Davidson, 578 N.W.2d 848, 861-64 (Neb. 1998) (finding stock options triggered a forty-three
percent tax rate, retention shares a thirty-two percent rate). Indeed, even a grant ofjust one
type may cause problems if the grant involves a series of acquisitions with different exercise
prices as with options or purchase prices in the case of restricted stock. In this event, each
component of the grant may have a different "basis" for tax purposes and thus a different
realizable value. Kapfer v. Kapfer, 419 S.E.2d 464, 469 (W. Va. 1992).
184. See Banning v. Banning, No. 95 CA 79, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2693, at *22 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 28, 1996). For a particularly bad example of a potentially unbalanced distribution
of this type, see Kinsey-Geujen v. Geujen, 984 S.W.2d 577,581 (Mo. App. 1999) (awarding one
party entire stock option package that might not survive employer's acquisition by another
entity and awarding other party future farm subsidy payments of unknown value). Nor can
it be said the courts necessarily are acting without thinking. In In re Marriage of Hug, the
court stated it would "be most equitable to fix the value of the community interests [in the
stock options] at the date of separation and distribute the community interests to the
employee spouse, awarding other community property of equivalent value to the nonemployee
spouse." 201 Cal. Rptr. 676, 686-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). The court specifically acknowledged
exercising the option was conditioned on continuing employment, and the underlying stock
might increase in value due to the employee's performance, or decrease in value due to the
company's poor performance or due to the economy. These risks, the court reasoned, were
best borne by the employee spouse. Id. Unless the options were exercisable, and marketable,
or could be valued using other marketable surrogates, it is hard to imagine how a realistic
value could be attached to the options in order to assign an "equivalent value" in community
interests to the other spouse.
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the values and, hence, proportions to reflect the relative risks, 8 5 but
given the uncertainties of the asset's realizable value, such a
procedure does not seem to be desirable. 8 ' Indeed, even if the
spouses receive equal shares in all marital property, the fact that
the realizable value is uncertain may destabilize the entire award
to a degree the court feels compelled to retain jurisdiction to the
point the actual value is known.'87 This theme, too, will be returned
to later in this article.
In the other scenarios, the grant is made during the marriage
for services to be rendered partly within the period the marriage en-
dures 88 or totally outside of that time frame.' 89 Some courts appear
to take the position that the mere fact an option is granted during
the marriage makes the option in its entirety marital property.190
185. In Warren v. Warren, 407 P.2d 395, 397-98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965), the appellate court
specifically directed the trial court not to adjust the value to reflect the fact the employee
might voluntarily terminate his employment. Clearly this risk was under the control of the
employee. What role other contingencies might play in the adjustment of value was not made
clear.
186. Also, it may not be technically possible. Virginia courts have held under an applicable
statute neither-spouse may receive more than a fifty percent share of unvested stock options
granted as deferred compensation. Dietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463, 470-71 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
187. In re Marriage of Miller, 915 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Colo. 1996). An appellate court in
Illinois has taken the position that contingencies associated with a stock option make the
option impossible to value. This meant the option could not constitute property available for
distribution under the Illinois statute. Accordingly, the court directed the trial court to retain
jurisdiction until the options were exercised, if that ever occurred, and to allocate an
appropriate share of any resulting profit. In re Marriage of Moody, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1026-27
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983). This apparently also was the result in In re Marriage of Huston, 967 P.2d
181, 183-84 (Colo. App. 1998), where the trial court was allowed to retain jurisdiction over the
"distribution and valuation" of the options so the parties would 'share in the risk of the fate
of each of the options." Why the retention ofjurisdiction was necessary is not clear given the
trial court had already allocated twenty-five percent of the options to the husband and
seventy-five percent to the employee wife. Id. at 183. Even more surprising is the appellate
court let the distribution ratio stand given that other assets and liabilities were distributed
equally. The court seems to have lost sight of the fact that mere common exposure to a risk
is not necessarily fair if the adverse impact of that risk will fall disproportionately on one of
the parties.
188. This may be true even if the grant itself is made after the point when the parties
interests are severed. See Goodwyne v. Goodwyne, 639 So. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (La. Ct. App.
1994).
189. It may not be a simple matter to determine the period for which the grant is intended
to provide compensation. Factors which impact this determination may include whether the
form of the compensation reflects an effort to secure optimal tax treatment, was offered to
induce the employee to accept employment, remain with employer, leave other employment,
or is linked to the achievement of a particular goal; and whether the award is made on a
regular or irregular basis. Davidson v. Davidson, 578 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Neb. 1998).
190. Id. (discussing the analysis of the court in Smith v. Smith, 682 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984)); Bodin v. Bodin, 955 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). But see Farish v.
Farish, 982 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (suggesting it might be relevant to
demonstrate the options were conferred for services rendered in a time frame other than
during the marriage).
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But, other courts reject this approach.'91 The ALI proposal seeks to
exclude from consideration as marital property certain assets
because their value is "inextricably intertwined with spousal skillsor earning capacity or post-marital labor."192  In this regard the
distribution of occupational licenses and educational degrees are not
divisible property, and business and professional goodwill earned
during the marriage will be divisible only to the extent that they
have value apart from the value of spousal earning capacity, spousal
skills, or post-dissolution labor.193 The conceptual problem we may
face is that the employee spouse generally may not have an
indefeasible entitlement to benefit from the incentive based scheme
except by virtue of satisfactorily exercising skills and labor for the
full qualifying period that may extend well beyond the marriage. 94
Is there a way to allocate some, but not all, of the resulting
value to the marital portion of the claim in a manner that ade-
quately finesses the risks of the assets non-realization and at the
same time recognizes the employee spouse's post-marital contribu-
tion? Conceptually, this process seems to be manageable provided
that the court does not attempt to "mix and match" classes of claims;
a distinction must be maintained between claims to property and
efforts to minimize income divergence. 9 ' Each spouse can be
allocated as a property distribution an appropriate share of that
portion of whatever value finally materializes, where the distribut-
able portion is determined by the time-span within the marriage
during which the benefit was "earned" 96 relative to the overall time
191. Demo v. Demo, 655 N.E.2d 791, 793 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the option
granted during the marriage based on job performance prior to marriage was not
distributable).
192. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.07, cmt. b, at 151.
193. Id. § 4.07(2)-(3), at 146.
194. The converse situation can be encountered also. The qualifying labor primarily may
have been contributed prior to the marriage, with the option vesting during the marriage.
The employee asserts the options are non-marital property. The claimant asserts the vesting
during the marriage characterizes the option in its entirety as marital property. See In re
Marriage of Fatora and Sullivan, No. CN95-10406, 1998 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 195, at *16-17
(Del. Fam. Ct. July 10, 1998).
195. See Kapfer v. Kapfer, 419 S.E.2d 464, 467 (W. Va. 1992); Chen v. Chen, 416 N.W.2d
661, 664 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). For an example of a situation where the court allowed the
property division award to be considered for the purposes of determining income, see Hokin
v. Hokin, 605 N.W.2d 219, 230 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding a share of pension plan funds
distributed to claimant could be used to impute an income to her because considerably older
husband at age seventy-four could be anticipated to retire relatively soon, so the court was
doing what would likely have happened in the ordinary course of events, absent the divorce).
196. Even this concept is not without problem. If the employee spouse was working for the
employer before the incentive scheme was granted, the decision has to be made whether the
appropriate time should commence from some point prior to the grant. In essence, the
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it took to "earn" the benefit.19 7 The relevant fraction is called the
"coverture fraction or factor" and its use is well established in the
context of distributing defined-benefit pensions.19 The underlying
basis for determining the distributable portion of the option is
commonly called the "time rule,"'99 for the obvious reason that the
marital "input" is reflected by the time spent during the marriage
engaged in the activity, rather than the value of labor contributed
during the marriage to the activity. Thus, a stock option whose
value could be realized2" after five years and was granted one year
argument is the compensation is, at least in part, retrospective in nature, not exclusively
prospective. See Nelson v. Nelson, 222 Cal. Rptr. 790, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
197. While this concept may be simple, the application may not be. For example, what if
during the marriage the spouse is granted an unconditional option (which is not exercised
during the marriage) to buy restricted stock - stock subject to risk of forfeiture? Essentially,
the option would be vested, but any stock purchased might not be vested until the restrictions
were lifted. See Harrison v. Harrison, 225 Cal. Rptr. 234, 238-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). For
the purposes of the analysis in this case, the court assumes the benefit has been "earned"
after the restrictions are finally lifted on the stock. This process is then used to determine the
coverture factor, discussed infra. Id. at 237-40. In contrast, in a Texas decision the employee
spouse was granted an option to purchase restricted stock. The options were "exercisable at
any time." See Charriere v. Charriere, 7 S.W.3d 217, 220 (Tex. App. 1999). The options were
held to be community property in their entirety, notwithstanding the fact the restrictions on
any stock acquired by exercising the options only would lift progressively over ten years
during which the employee spouse had to remain in employment. Id. The entire ten-year
period would be post-divorce, and if the option holder left employment any unexercised
options would be forfeited. Id. Louisiana also has taken the position that restricted stock
acquired during the marriage will be a community asset notwithstanding that future services
by the employee were envisaged by the scheme. Mestayer v. Williams, 569 So. 2d 1102, 1105-
07 (La. Ct. App. 1990). The court distinguished between ownership that vested in the marital
community and the ability of the "owners" to deal with the stock regulated by the restrictions.
Id. This approach has been criticized as too simplistic. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes,
52 LA. L. REV. 655,669 (1992) (suggesting if the employee can demonstrate the asset is in part
attributable to separate effort after the community ends, the court should adopt a mixed
classification, rather than a single classification that only produces "rough equity"). Another
criticism emerges if one postulates that the stock was purchased with separate funds, but the
period spent working to free the stock from restrictions occurred during the marriage. See J.
THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 7.11[4] (1999).
A few jurisdictions have attempted a pro rata approach. Id.
198. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.08 cmt. f, at 179. See also Macaleer v. Macaleer, 725 A.2d 829,
835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). For a general discussion of the use of coverture fractions in the
context of divorce cases, see Lawrence D. Dodds & Robert D. Feder, Stock Options in Divorce
- A National Trend, 13 AM. J. FAM. L. 105, 105-09 (1999). The Colorado Supreme Court has
noted a potential difference between pensions and stock options. See Malone, supra note 140,
at 88. Unlike a pension, an option may be granted for future services, past services, or both.
Id. For our purposes the significance of this is that particular care needs to be taken when
structuring the coverture fraction.
199. See In re Marriage of Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
DeJesus v. DeJesus, 687 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (N.Y. 1997).
200. Ordinarily, the period covered by the denominator should come to an end when the
option could be exercised, rather than when it is exercised. Using the latter point generally
would leave the option holder free to dilute the claimant's share by effectively reducing the
distributable fraction of the grant. See Chimes v. Michael, 748 A.2d 1065, 1067-69 (Md. Ct.
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before the dissolution of the marriage could be treated, to the extent
of twenty percent of its value, as distributable property.2"' The
remaining eighty percent should only be considered in the context
of calculating income disparities for the purposes of compensatory
awards. °2 Of course, this approach only works if the option is
awarded entirely for future endeavors or primarily is intended to
operate as "golden handcuffs."203  If the award is partly to reflect
labor prior to the award, and that labor also occurred during the
marriage, the numerator in the fraction reflecting the distributable
share must be increased.2°' This result also seems to follow if the
court adopts the position that general contributions by the non-
employee spouse to the marriage puts the employee spouse in a
position to be awarded the benefit." 5 In such a situation the
numerator might be extended back to cover the entire period from
the start of the marriage, or perhaps only to the commencement of
Spec. App. 2000). While it is true if the parties had stayed married the actual exercise of the
option might have been delayed beyond the point of vesting, in such a situation both of the
parties would have benefited from the grant in its entirety. Moreover, linking the denomina-
tor to the point of exercise effectively leaves the option holder as the parties' risk manager
beyond the point when the grant requires it.
201. "Realizing" the value may require thought on a case-by-case basis. If the option vests
after three years, so that the employee could demand the conveyance at that point, but the
parties are divorced a year after the grant, arguably the non-employee spouse could lay claim
to one-third of the stock. But if the incentive scheme's rules preclude that employee from
alienating the stock for a further year, during which the employee has to remain an employee
or the stock will be repurchased at the option exercise price, so that the scheme also has the
hallmarks of a restricted stock scheme, the period to "realization" will depend on what in fact
happens. In a scenario such as this, even the portion that is to be viewed as marital property
- never mind its value - may be indeterminate at the time of divorce. Also, the possibility
exists that the prospective labor for which the grant is awarded is to be completed inside the
vesting period. See Malone, supra note 140, at 88. In such an event the denominator in the
coverture fraction should be reduced if it is considered appropriate to do so. The better view,
however, would seem to be if the option grant is at risk unless the employee remains in
employment for the requisite period of time, that time also should be included in the
denominator. The employee is not imposing the delay until the option can be exercised freely.
202. This approach seems to have been adopted by a majority of jurisdictions that have
considered the matter. See Bornemann v. Bornemann, 752 A.2d 978, 988-89 (Conn. 1998).
The idea that a stock option can be viewed as both an asset and a source of income has been
criticized for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that this treatment might result
in an inefficient use of resources, and involves an unfair distribution of risk and tax
consequences. See Jack E. Karns & Jerry G. Hunt, Annual Eighth Circuit Survey Article:
Should Unexercised Stock Options be Considered 'Gross Income" Under State Law for
Purposes of Calculating Monthly Child Support Payments?, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 235, 255-
60 (2000).
203. See Garcia v. Mayer, 920 P.2d 522, 526 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
204. See In re Marriage of Hug, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676,679,681-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Garcia
v. Mayer, 920 P.2d 522,525 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); DeJesus v. DeJesus, 687 N.E.2d 1319, 1324
(N.Y. 1997).
205. On the question of contribution, see infra text accompanying note 215.
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employment with the relevant employer.2" Further complications
ensue when the marriage materializes after the grant of the option
and ends before it is exercisable, and the grant is both a reward for
prior activities and contingent on future performance. 7 The
position may also be complicated because the option scheme itself
may have mixed goals, leading to varying portions of the scheme
requiring differing treatments.2 °s Sometimes the grant itself may
be complex, involving, for example, a series of options.2 9 One
approach to dealing with such a situation allows the court to adopt
the position that unvested options granted during the marriage are
marital property, but are acquired only over time as the options
vest. Where the grant involves serially vesting options, the options
may be considered to vest consecutively, not concurrently. This
analysis enables the court to apply a time rule to some of the grant
and entirely exclude other portions of the grant from consideration
as marital property.2 0 A few jurisdictions have opted for simplicity.
If the option is granted during the marriage it is distributable
property regardless of when the services are to be performed.21'
Other jurisdictions take the view that even if the option is granted
during the marriage, it is not distributable property if it is not
exercisable and may be forfeited in the future.212 Finally, lest any
206. See In re Marriage of Hug, 201 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Grich v. Grich,
No. FA93 525311S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3451, at *16-17, *21 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 31,
1996).
207. For formulae that may be used to cover these various combinations, see Davidson v.
Davidson, 578 N.W.2d 848, 856-58 (Neb. 1998).
208. See In re Marriage of Short, 890 P.2d 12, 16-17 (Wash. 1995). In this case, a portion
of the options was granted for present services to induce the husband to accept employment,
and was completely community property because the employment commenced during the
marriage. Other portions were for future services, some of which fell beyond the date of
separation, and were therefore subject to the time rule. Finally, a portion of the options was
found granted for a period entirely beyond the period of the marriage. For a discussion of
some of the difficulties in deciding whether the award was for future services, see Michael A.
Ealy, Note, The Characterization of a Contingent Interest in an Employer Stock Option Upon
Dissolution of the Marital Community: In re the Marriage of Short, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 691, 703-
11 (1996); Malone, supra note 140, at 90-91.
209. Employers are driven to use a system of progressive vesting of options and serial
grants of such benefits in order to ensure the incentive component of the compensation
package remains adequate as the option holder cashes out specific options. Schizer, supra
note 145, at 448-49.
210. See In re Marriage of Short, 890 P.2d 12, 16-17 (Wash. 1995). This approach has been
criticized because it ignores the contribution during the marriage to the acquisition of the
stock option right. See Ealy, supra note 208, at 716. The Washington Supreme Court adopted
the rule under the impetus of the state's community property statute. Id. at 715. California,
in contrast, recognizes the contribution made during the marriage and applies a time rule to
all of the options made under the grant. Id. at 716.
211. See cases cited in Bornemann v. Bornemann, 752 A.2d 978, 989 (Conn. 1998).
212. Hall v. Hall, 363 S.E.2d 189, 195-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
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court get too complacent, all the calculations may in reality turn out
to be flawed, because option vesting dates may accelerate in the
course of corporate mergers, restructuring, or by virtue of perfor-
mance benchmarks being exceeded. 3
At this stage, our concern is with the portion of the asset that
is distributable, not with assigning a value to that portion. Of
course, this premise is that each year of labor contributes equally to
the resulting benefit. It is open to question whether the premise can
be justified in the case of an employee who, after the divorce but
while the benefit is still "maturing," is promoted to a position which
significantly impacts the value of the relevant stock.214 If the
claimant is able to argue that her contributions during the marriage
made it possible for the employee spouse to achieve the promotion,
her case for a strictly time-related share would be stronger.215
Under the ALI proposals, however, the concept of a contribution
other than to the marriage itself is rejected216 in favor of what seems
213. See OLDHAM, supra note 197, at § 7.11[3][a]. Moreover, there is no standard rule that
in the event of a "change in control" all option holders will become fully vested. The
acceleration may apply only to some option holders, and it may do no more than shorten the
period to vesting by a specified time, say twelve months, so that a person who had acquired
options with a three-year vesting period, and who had held the options for twelve months
when the merger occurred would be deemed to have held the options for twenty-four months
following the acceleration, but the options would still not be vested. Ultimately, it depends
on the terms of the grant and the structure of the merger whether the option survives.
214. The impact need not be significant. In New Jersey, the court reduced the claimant's
share in options awarded during the marriage to reflect the fact that the employee spouse's
efforts might contribute "in some small way" to the appreciation in value of the underlying
stock. Callahan v. Callahan, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
215. In any event, at some point the link between the purported contribution and the
resulting benefit might be too attenuated. A contribution-based analysis seems to have been
viewed as acceptable in Bornemann v. Bornemann, 752 A.2d 978,989-90,995-96 (Conn. 1998).
Similarly, the husband in Pascale v. Pascale was able to assert stock options granted after the
divorce to the wife in recognition of her promotion were marital property in part because of
"his role as husband and father contributed in some way to [her] success, which increased her
worth for that promotion." 660 A.2d 485, 498-99 (N.J. 1995). The converse problem also can
arise. What if the promotion occurs during the marriage and the claimant suggests the
enhanced benefits were a function of her contributions, but the marriage has been relatively
brief and the employee is a long-term employee? Is it appropriate to treat the incentive-based
compensation package as marital property? See Davidson v. Davidson, 578 N.W.2d 848, 858-
59 (Neb. 1998) (discussing a couple married thirty-eight months, but separated after two
years, while career spanned thirty-three years). A similar sort of problem arose in Vick v.
Vick, 675 So. 2d 714, 716-7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Here, the husband's employer gave a
gift of stock during the marriage. The court held it was marital property only to the extent
that his efforts during the marriage had contributed to an increase in the stock's value. See
also OLDHAM, supra note 197, at § 7.11[3][a].
216. PFD, supra note 2, § 4.15, cmt. c, at 197. The concept of "contribution" is not rejected
in the context of distributing a defined contribution pension plan. The ALI accepts that the
claimant should have a share of the contributions made to the plan during the marriage
together with the appreciation of those contributions after the marriage. Id. at § 4.08, cmt.
f, at 178.
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the easier concept of simply determining whether the asset was
acquired through spousal labor during the marriage.
Underlying all of the above concerns is the question of when, if
ever, is it appropriate to "decouple" the non-employee spouse from
the upside, or indeed downside, potential of the incentive package
that was earned during the marriage? "Cashing out" the non-
employee's participation through assigning a value to that interest
could accomplish this.217 Alternatively, in some schemes, it might
be possible to actually cash out some measure of the actual value.218
What value should be employed for these purposes is an issue to
which we now turn.
c. What Value Should Be Assigned to the Incentive
Based Scheme?
Unless the court can delay dealing with an incentive based
compensation scheme until the day any value actually materializes,
or grants the parties an equal share of whatever value does
eventually materialize,2" 9 the determination of value220 is both
critical and problematic. At the conceptual root of the problem is
that the case may concern a situation where "it is true that an
unassignable, unsalable option has no fair market value, [but] it is
nonetheless an economic resource,... to which a value can be
attributed."22" '
When it comes to property division the court can determine a
spouse's share of the asset. Unless there is no need to determine
equivalencies, for example where each spouse obtains the same
relative share of every asset that is marital property, it becomes
necessary to determine the value of the incentive scheme in order
to determine the relative value of each spouse's overall share of
217. See In re Marriage of Hug, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
218. In Rehfeldt v. Rehfeldt, No. C-850056, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5603, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 12, 1986), the options carried with them Alternative Appreciation Rights. These
rights permitted the holder to relinquish the options and receive the difference between the
option exercise price and the market value of the stock, taxed at ordinary income rates. Id.
The court went along with the referee's view that allowing the husband to exercise the rights
with respect to the wife's share would be wasteful because it would involve sacrificing the
favorable tax treatment that would be available if the options were exercised as such. Id. at
*9, *16.
219. See, e.g., Chen v. Chen, 416 N.W.2d 661, 662-64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
present value of option not determinable at time of trial and award of half share of whatever
benefit accrues after option exercised and the resulting stock ultimately sold).
220. See generally Eric Hollowell, Annotation, Valuation of Stock Options for Purposes of
Divorce Court's Property Distribution, 46 A.L.R. 4th 689 (2000).
221. Green v. Green, 494 A.2d 721, 728 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
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marital property. 2 Indeed, this may be true even if it is possible to
allocate equal portions of each asset to the spouses. For example,
a recipient of an interest in stock or options may not wish to be
vulnerable to the risks associated with having a now former - and
possibly hostile - spouse potentially in control of the underlying
value of the stock or option.223 Valuation also is critical in the
context of considering the incentive based scheme as a source of
income, and thus relevant for determining the compensation awards
the ALI proposes.
The difficulty with valuing the benefits of schemes such as stock
options and restricted stocks is that they tend to have two sets of
risk factors associated with them. One set of risks, are those
associated with the marketplace generally.2" The other involves
"Cpersonal" risks associated with the employee beneficiary and his or
her employment relationship as well as the relevant tax strictures.
A New Jersey court used an interesting technique in order to
circumvent some of these problems. It impressed a constructive
trust on the options in the hands of the employee.22 Notionally,
222. One commentator suggests that a distribution in kind form of property division will
provide the court with a greater opportunity to accept "approximate" valuations. However,
unless the court distributes equal shares with balanced degrees of "approximation" across all
classes of assets, the risks in individual divorce cases of pockets of injustice are not
insubstantial. See Sharp, supra note 162, at 2142-43.
223. See, for example, the scheme alleged in Richmond v. American Systems Corp., 792 F.
Supp. 449, 451 (E.D. Va. 1992), where a spouse receiving stock in a divorce settlement alleges
unlawful dilution of equity interest.
224. For a detailed discussion of risk factors associated with derivatives in general and
options in particular, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A
Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1 (1997). The author
defines "market" risks more narrowly than the term is used in the present article. Id. at 18.
Additionally, she identifies credit, legal, operational, liquidity, and systemic risks. Id. at 31,
35, 39, 45, 47. These various classes of risk may have subsets of risk associated with them.
Thus, the market risk of an option may be a function of the delta (the relationship between
the rate of change of price of the option and the price of the underlying stock), elasticity (the
percentage change in the option price flowing from a one percent change in the price of the
stock), convexity (the rate of change of the delta relative to a change in price of the stock),
volatility (the price movement of the underlying stock), time decay (the loss in value of the
option simply by virtue of the fact that it is approaching the time for exercise), and discount
rate (the impact on the value of the instrument due to changes in the discount rate used to
discount future returns to present value). Id. at 17-20. Most of these subtleties need not be
considered for our present puroses. For our concerns market risks will be those arising from
all of these forces that are applicable to market in general. Personal risks will be those
pertaining particularly to the option holder and his or her ability to realize the value of the
option, as the market risks determine that value to be.
225. The court directed the option holder to exercise the options when instructed to do so
by the claimant on condition that she provide him with the necessary funds, and ordered the
employee to hold in trust any stock resulting from the exercise of the option, or to sell the
stock as directed by claimant, turning over the proceeds to her. The court, however, forbade
a sale that would violate the Securities and Exchange Commission's "insider trading" rules.
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marketplace risks are separate from the risks that an individual
employee faces, but as we shall see that is not always true.
Superficially, market risks would have a discounting effect on
the value to an investor of a contingent asset that would vary with
the risk preferences of the individual investor. If that is true, it
would be nigh on impossible to assign a value to incentive based
compensation packages on divorce which would reflect a "fair"
allocation of assets unless the spouses' risk preferences were
identical.226 The relevant risks are those intrinsic to the asset itself,
and those associated with the sensitivity of the asset to the move-
ment of the market as a whole.
The above concerns can be dealt with in one of two ways. First,
both spouses might be left in a position where they are able to
generate a portfolio of assets sufficiently diversified to offset the
parties' senses of the risks associated with any given asset.27 The
obvious shortcoming of this approach is it requires that the risks be
Moreover, the claimant had to indemnify the employee for any tax liability that attached to
him. See Callahan v. Callahan, 361 A.2d 561, 564 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). This
procedure does not deal with the issue of how the uncertain outcome is to be reflected by the
parties relative shares of other assets. In this regard, the court technically seems to have
erred in awarding the claimant only a twenty-five percent share of the options. Id. This
unbalanced allocation of an interest of uncertain size potentially unbalances the entire
distribution scheme. Arguably, this unfortunate outcome resulted from the fact that the court
had to distribute options that were only discovered after the rest of the divorce distribution
was finalized. Id. at 352. In a case in a different state, the court impressed a constructive
trust on the options, but. left control over whether and when to exercise the options in the
hands of the option holder. See Smith v. Smith, 682 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
This would seem to impose on the claimant risks associated with the option holder's conduct
that would be in addition to those arising from market forces and the employment
relationship. Perhaps the constructive trust requires fiduciary behavior that would eliminate
these risks. Conventionally, however, imposition of a constructive trust does not generate a
"constructive trustee." A totally different argument for employing a constructive trust
technique is it provides a mechanism for bypassing restrictions on alienation contained in the
grant or imposed by tax law. See Webster & deLisser, supra note 3, at 147, 148, 150. These
authors argue if the option is held in the context of a community property regime, any
transfer pursuant to a divorce is not a violation of the restrictions on transfer. Id. at 148. For
tax purposes, however, they suggest that an ISO's preferred status will be lost, community
property jurisdiction or not, unless a constructive trust type transfer of the beneficial interest
alone occurs. Id. at 150. The authors conclude that a constructive trust device may be the
only means of bypassing restrictions on transfer in non-community property jurisdictions. Id.
at 148. Arguably, tax concerns aside, an employer could seek to limit the transfer of the
beneficial interest by the express terms of the grant, and, indeed, given the employer's
incentive concerns, may have done so by implication from the other express restrictions on
transfer.
226. One might argue that the "acquisition" of the compensation package during the
marriage justifies presuming the spouses have the same risk preferences, but such an
analysis seems to be highly forced.
227. See, for example, the discussion of the Capital Asset Pricing Model in Estate of
Hendrickson v. Commissioner, No. 21225-97, 1999 T.C.M. LEXIS 318, at *51-53 (U.S. T.C.
Aug. 23, 1999).
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identifiable and that the former spouses are left with sufficient
surplus assets to implement the necessary hedging.228
If, however, we can come up with a valuation device which frees
the value of an asset from the risk predispositions of the individual
investor, we have eliminated one whole set of concerns which would
impact the valuation of the asset on divorce. This is the particular
appeal of the Black-Scholes229 type formula which is now widely
230mentioned in the cases, even though they may be less widely
relied upon.2 31  Unfortunately, the basic Black-Scholes formula
embodies assumptions as to some elements which are of are of
particular relevance to our concerns. For example, the formula is
critically dependent on information regarding market volatility.232
That volatility is in turn a function of the information that is
228. For some insight into the difficulties and expenses associated with the process,
particularly if the instruments are not exchange traded, see Krawiec, supra note 224, at 21-
22.
229. For a collection of material relating to the formula and its applications, see THE
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES READER (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1992). Basically, the Black-Scholes
formula requires one to know the price of the underlying stock, the time before the option
matures, the price to exercise the option, the market interest rate, and the volatility of the
stock. See FISCHER BLACK, Fact and Fantasy in the Use of Options, in THE FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES READER 180 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1992).
,230. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, 578 N.W.2d 848, 858 (Neb. 1998).
231. See Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA 960149562S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3104, at *27-28
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1997) (rejecting Black-Scholes valuation formula in favor of intrinsic
valuation); Chammah v. Chammah, FA 95145944S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1896, at *14-15
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 1997) (Black-Scholes and intrinsic valuation techniques rejected,
the former as inaccurate for valuing "employment issued stock options in a marital context,"
the latter as inaccurate "under the facts of this case").
232. Technically, the valuation of options may be conducted using information relating to
historical volatility. At least as far as exchange traded options are concerned, this
information would be available to the market. Historical volatility, however, may be
unreliable and valuation based on "implied volatility" is often preferred. If the option price
is known, it is possible by doing calculations in 'reverse" to determine what volatility factor
must have been imputed to the instrument in fixing its price. See LAWRENCE G. MCMILLAN,
OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT 411-12 (1986); Krawiec, supra note 224, at 19-20. If the
market price is not known, however, the investor must determine an implied volatility factor
to use based on views or information relating to future events available to him or her.
Moreover, because the implied volatility may change without any change in value of the
underlying stock, an option holder who has sought to protect the overall value of a portfolio
by hedging may unexpectedly find himself or herself with an unbalanced portfolio. Krawiec,
supra note 224, at 19. Efforts continue to project historical volatility into the future. See, e.g.,
Mark Britten-Jones & Anthony Neuberger, Option Prices, Implied Price Processes, and
Stochastic Volatility, 55 J. FIN. 839 (2000). The formula term used to represent volatility is
'vega." It represents a dollar value change in the option value for each percent change
(positive or negative) in volatility. Perhaps a more appropriate term would be "vaguer." This
suggestion seems to be borne out by a recent article cautioning option traders using a
stochastic volatility model because the so-called volatility "smile" in options valued using a
Black-Scholes pricing model could not be explained by correcting for "negative skewness" and
'excessive kurtosis." See, e.g., Gary S. Moore & Rakesh Patel, Should Options Traders Rely
on Stochastic Volatility Option Pricing Models?, 6 DERIVATIVES Q. 23 (2000).
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available to the market. The information that is available to the
employee spouse, however, may differ from that which is available
to the market.233 For example, the volatility may be affected by a
major development in product line, or by an unannounced merger
with another more or less volatile corporation. 234 The fact that the
employee is privy to information which is not available to the
market represents a transition point from market risk factors 235 to
personal risks.236 Parenthetically, this fact also raises the interest
233. Research seems to indicate that managers delay the release of good news until after
options have been awarded. See Gretchen Morgenson, Hidden Costs of Stock Options May
Come Back to Haunt, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,2000, at Al. Of course, merely being an employee
may not ensure that the option holder has access to the relevant information, much less the
option holder's ex-spouse. DeBriae v. Attachmate Corp., Case No. 43561-2, 2000 Wash. App.
LEXIS 127, at *2-3, *10-11 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2000) (noting former employee's ex-
spouse sued employer for fraud alleging the employer concealed from her ex-husband the
value of options which it bought back from him and which the claimant alleged were partly
community property).
234. See BLACK, supra note 229, at 184-85.
235. The fact that the employees generally may be aware of critical information has led at
least some employers to impose an insider trading policy on all employees. See Geanne
Rosenberg, Insiders Get a Sturdy Tool to Rake in Stock Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2000, at
Cl. Being privy to such information means it might be difficult for the employee to realize
the benefits of an incentive scheme without being guilty of insider trading. To alleviate this
problem, the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently amended its rules to enable
the employee'to dispose of his or her interest provided this occurs under a plan created prior
to the employee becoming aware of"insider" information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(i).
The claimant's position is that of everyone else in the market. If we assume that
when the option holder was offered the options he or she was in the same information neutral
position as the rest of the market, the employee notionally might have insisted on a premium
element to the option award to offset the risks of the existence of information of which he or
she might be unaware. Theoretically, the claimant's award on divorce might reflect a similar
such premium, but it is difficult to see how realistically this might be quantified in the
absence of the information itself. Another way to look at the problem is to assume the
employee was fully informed at the time of the grant. In such a case, the size of the grant
itself presumably reflects the anticipated impact of the information on the value of the option
itself. If this is the case, does the structure of the risks assumed during the marriage entitle
the claimant to anything other than an appropriate share of the options at whatever value
happens to materialize? The beauty of such an analysis is that it justifies not engaging in
anticipatory valuation. Moreover, it ducks any need to attempt to quantify risks in advance
of the realization of the asset.
236. For a nice example of this situation, see Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,
434-35 (7th Cir. 1987) (imposing duty to disclose to employee of a close corporation who held
restricted stock that the corporation was in merger talks with a public corporation, even
though the publicly traded corporation would not ordinarily owe the same duty to its
employees). Purely personal risk assessment may merge with matters associated with issues
not generally available to the market. Id. at 451-52 (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that any
knowledge of the benefits of the impending merger would have to be weighed against potential
domestic conflict if employee had not resigned and forgone the benefits of the merger).
A potential information gap between the parties renders questionable a device
employed by a court in Alabama in effort to get the option holder to price the risks of future
events. In Keff v. Keff, 757 So. 2d 450, 451 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000), the trial court gave the
option holder the choice of paying the claimant only after the options had vested, using the
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ing possibility of requiring the disclosure of confidential insider
information in the course of the domestic dispute of an. employee.
Additionally, the Black-Scholes formula is less reliable when the
underlying instrument pays dividends,237 which is common both in
the case of stock options and restricted stock schemes. This concern
may be particularly problematic as the not uncommon multi-year
alienation restriction to which an employee is subject may result in
the benefit holder being exposed to a protracted period of relatively
unquantifiable volatility.23 In short, there may be real problem in
translating a particular employee benefit scheme into an item of
"universal" value. Finally, Black-Scholes modeling is premised on
the existence of a market for the underlying instruments. 9 Such
a market may not truly exist in the case of closely held corporations,
although it might be possible in some circumstances to identify an
appropriate "surrogate" instrument.
The relationship between the employee spouse, and the
employer is also something that is worth evaluating in attempting
to assign a "universal" value to a scheme. For example, a non-
employee spouse may be willing to accept direct participation in a
share of an incentive based compensation scheme based on a Black-
Scholes attributed value. Unlike a freely tradable option, however,
an incentive based scheme may be subject to defeasance by the
employer.24 ° Given that the scheme is designed to operate as an
incentive for the employee, in the employer's eyes that incentive will
be weakened to the extent that the beneficial interest is assigned to
a non-employee's soon-to-be-former spouse."' Accordingly, the
value at that time, or within thirty days of the decree using the current market value of the
options. An "insider" clearly has an advantage under such an arrangement.
237. FISCHER BLACK & MYRON SCHOLES, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
in THE FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES READER 157, 160, 168 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1992).
238. There might be complications on top of complications. It was only in February 1999
that the Securities and Exchange Commission amended its rules pertaining to form S-8 to
allow the offer and sale by a publicly traded company of stock received on the exercise of an
option by an employee's family member who had acquired the option pursuant to a court order
flowing from domestic litigation. See Marla G. Franzese & Martha N. Steinman, Estate
Planning Benefits of Transferable Stock Options, 32 NYSBA TR. & EST. L. SEC. NEWSL.
(Winter 1999), at http://www.nysba.org/sections/tande/newsletters/winter99/stockoptions.htm
(last visited Nov. 30, 2001).
239. The model may be able to handle the contingencies inherent in the option scheme,
even if they restrict the option's marketability. See Chammah v. Chammah, No. FA
95145944S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1896, at *13-14 (Conn. Super. July 11, 1997).
240. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hoak, 364 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 1985).
241. The same result might follow if the distribution scheme adopted by the court required
an employee to exercise an option and liquidate the benefit. Of course, the scheme's structure
must permit this to occur and so in a sense, the employer has assumed the risks of the loss
of the incentive. At least one court has stated a court may not adopt a distribution scheme
which compels an employee to exercise options, because the effect of so-doing is to deprive him
2002] ALl PROPOSALS 297
employer might see it as in its self-interest to cancel the relevant
scheme and replace it with another in which the former spouse will
not participate. 242 The employer's motivation to act would exist
even in the absence of a collusive2' enterprise between employer
and employee,2" and if the employee is important enough to the
employer, the motive for collusion on both sides will be substantial.
In one sense, this represents a sub-case of unknown information
impacting volatility. In another sense, it represents a manifestation
of the risk atmosphere in which the employee alone operates.24
This suggests that a non-employee spouse should be circumspect
about taking a direct share of the incentive scheme,246 even if that
of the essence of his property interest, namely the right to make a choice regarding the
exercise of the options. See Green v. Green, 494 A.2d 721, 728 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). This
argument would seem to be misguided. Spouses have ownership interests in all sorts of
property which interests should entitle them to dictate the future treatment of the property.
Divorce courts, however, routinely compel liquidation or conveyance of such assets.
242. Of course, the non-employee spouse, through court order or agreement, could attempt
to ensure access to any successor benefit package. The replacement scheme, however, may
have a risk or benefit structure that differs from the original in a way that adversely impacts
the non-employee former spouse. Replacement may occur in a deliberate effort to bolster the
employee's incentive in the face of a divorce-based alienation, or it may arise from market
considerations, as where the exercise price of an option is "repriced" following a stock price
decline. See Schitzer, supra note 145, at 458 n.61.
243. An employer's interest in an option or restricted stock grant may extend beyond
ensuring that the employee has an incentive to perform. The grant may turn the employee
or a group of employees into "relational" investors with the power to entrench management.
Management, in turn, would be in a position to enhance the employee's post-divorce interests.
See generally Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 987 (1994). Thus, for example, where restricted stock carries voting rights, the
employer may not be a totally disinterested party when it comes to the distribution of the
restricted stock on divorce. Accordingly, apart from a concern to maintain an incentive, an
employer may wish to structure the incentive package in a way that ensures that the
beneficial owner's interests and those of management do not diverge.
244. A conspiracy was alleged by the non-employee spouse in Mendenco, Inc. v. Myklebust,
615 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1981), for failing to voluntarily disclose information about unemploy-
ment benefits. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for
the employer.
245. The claimant may have a risk atmosphere of his own. There is a report that a major
accounting firm directed a senior audit manager to give up a claim in divorce proceedings to
a share of his wife's multi-million dollar option package granted by the firm's client, or leave
the firm, on the basis that a conflict of interest might result if he did not do so. He left the
firm. Elizabeth MacDonald, Accountant Faces Salvo From SEC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000,
at A3.
246. A claimant can get trapped between the proverbial rock and a hard place. In In re
Marriage of Frederick, 578 N.E.2d 612, 617-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), the claimant felt that the
employee spouse might not act in her best interests and might not exercise the options,
leaving her with nothing. The trial court awarded her fifty percent of the profits from any
exercise of the options, and retained jurisdiction to distribute any such profits. Id. The
claimant did not ask for the options to be transferred to her, or for the right to exercise the
options directly. She asked only that the retained jurisdiction include the right to petition the
court to compel the employee spouse to exercise the option at the petitioner's expense. The
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is technically possible.247
Where an ALI proposed compensation order is predicated on the
establishment of the "value" of an incentive based compensation
scheme, as where the realization of a series of options or the sale of
restricted stock is viewed as part of a process of generating income
after the divorce, issues become more problematic. Obviously, if a
technique like the Black-Scholes formula is employed to assign a
value and it is not accurate in its predictions, either of the spouses
may be overly burdened.248 Moreover, as we saw, the scope for
appellate court denied her request. Id.
247. It may not be. For example, I.R.C. § 422(b)(5) deprives a stock option scheme of its
recognition as an Incentive Stock Option scheme if it is transferable, except by will or the laws
of descent, or it is exercisable by anyone other than the employee. See Webster & de Lisser,
supra note 3, at 149. Similarly, in a recent field service advice memorandum, the IRS
indicated that options transferred pursuant to a divorce decree would generate taxable income
in the hands of the husband on the basis that he had received compensation, through the
release of marital rights, equal to the fair market value of the options at the time of transfer.
After exercising the options the wife held them with a basis of the exercise price and the
carryover from the husband's taxable transfer. She would be liable for any capital gain
realized when she sold the stock. The IRS position is that I.R.C. § 1041 only sheltered the
inter-spousal transfer, not the husband's realization of income. Field Serv. Adv. 200005006
(Nov. 1, 1999). This position obviously opens up the possibility of a taxable event that
intrinsically does not generate revenue to pay the taxes - presumably producing a strong
disincentive to transfer the options and their associated risk. The suggestion has been made
that these concerns should dictate either that assets of equal value should be transferred in
lieu of the options, or that the net after tax proceeds should be transferred when the option
is finally exercised. See Natalie L. Bell, Divorce-related Transfer of Compensatory Stock
Options is Taxable, 31 TAXADVISER 537,539 (2000). There is a existing body of tax law which
suggests if a non-qualified stock option is transferred between spouses pursuant to a divorce
and the option is community property by virtue of having been granted during the marriage,
and there is an approximately equal division of community assets generally, though not
necessarily equally of each asset, then the transfer of the option will not be a taxable event.
Webster & de Lisser, supra note 3, at 148, 149; Bell, supra at 539.
Logically, an even more likely technical obstacle would be a termination provision
in the scheme itself, given the foreseeable erosion of the incentive structure in the event of
premature alienation, particularly an involuntary alienation under court order. Employers
generally may not yet be aware of this problem, but it is only a matter of time. Authors have
already noted that in order to maintain the incentive value of option packages, employers
have imposed restrictions on transferability, such as limiting recipients to immediate family
members. Franzese & Steinman, supra note 238, at 14, 16. Given our present concerns, such
a restriction may not be adequate.
248. Thus, one court recognized that even though the underlying stock was worth less than
the option exercise price, the option might have value, based on how likely it was that the
market price might rise above the option price. What techniques like the Black-Scholes
formula attempt to do is assign that value. Nevertheless, in this case the court said that an
assigned measure of worth would be speculative and thus could not be used to value a stock
option for distribution purposes. Banning v. Banning, No. 95 CA 79, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS
2693, at *20 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 1996). Accordingly, the appellate court suggested the
trial court might consider ordering a deferred distribution on a "when and if" basis in the
same proportions as other property had been distributed. In another case, the option holder
successfully argued that the option had no value because he was an "insider" and thus could
not "trade" in the option, which extended to precluding him from exercising the options. The
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modification of a compensation order under the ALI proposal is not
balanced. Ordinarily, a higher than anticipated yield will short-
change the non-employee spouse and is not correctable.249 More
fundamentally, however, the Black-Scholes technique does not
normally address the risks associated with the employee spouse's
actual realization of the value. It does not take into account those
risk factors that do not apply to the market in general but do apply
to the employee. These range from risks of the scheme's termina-
tion as was just mentioned, an employee failing to satisfy qualifying
conditions,25 ° to being held accountable for a value which the model
suggests is intrinsic to the scheme but which cannot in fact be
realized given the particular tax treatment of the scheme.251
court held that in the circumstances it would be appropriate to award all the options to the
holder. Waldron v. Waldron, C.A. No. 2729, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5795, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 18, 1992).
249. PFD, supra note 2, § 5.09, at 357-58. One perspective is that the most common
methods of valuing options often badly understate the value because they do not take into
account the demand for the stock when it is offered on the open market. See David
Leonhardt, In the Options Age, Rising Pay (and Risk): Order of Compensation Universe
Reflects Pull of New Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, § 3, at 13. There is already some
pressure from former spouses to share in "unexpected" increases in the value of retirement
benefits, presumably the same problem is likely to arise where option schemes were valued
improvidently. See Margaret A. Jacobs, As Workers' Pensions Swell in Value, Ex-Spouses
Demand a Share, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2000, at B1. In this regard, one apparently
unresolved question arises from the fact an employer may be free to "reprice" the option grant
in the face of a market downturn. At least two problems flow from this possibility. First, is
this repriced option to be viewed as a totally new grant, so that a non-employee former spouse
who was allocated a share of the earlier grant when and if it materializes loses out
completely? Or, is the process to be viewed as simply "adjusting" the value of the initial grant,
notwithstanding the fact that the employee, now former spouse, would have left the employer
when the option went "out of the money" unless the employer repriced? Repricing now causes
a "fixed" stock option to be reclassified as a "variable" option with significant accounting
consequences. Under a "variable" scheme, the "costs" of the option compensation must be
amortized, on a variable basis. Essentially, the cost is the difference between the strike price
* and the market value, as that value changes. As a result, as the stock price goes up, the "cost"
of the option to the employer does as well, so that the employer's earnings will be reduced.
See Anthony F. Cocco, FASB Interpretation No. 44, 70 CPA J. 22 (2000); Am. Inst. Cert. Pub.
Accts., FASB Offers More Guidance on Stock Options, 190 J. ACCT. 22 (2000). This
phenomenon may dissuade the employer from "repricing." Rather a new option grant may be
preferable, perhaps with a shorter vesting period. Such a process, presumably, leaves the
non-employee former spouse out in the cold unless the divorce carefully secures an interest
in any "replacement" scheme.
250. See Bornemann v. Bornemann, 752 A.2d 978, 991 (Conn. 1998).
251. For some examples of the impact of tax consequences on the value of options, see
BLACK, supra note 229, at 187-89. Perhaps noteworthy too is the fact that an option is worth
less to an investor in a higher marginal tax bracket. Id. at 187. Technically, this means that
for the purposes of property division, simply giving each spouse an equal before tax share in
the options will not produce an equal distribution of the assets if the spouses are not in the
same tax bracket. This is particularly relevant because ordinarily during the marriage they
will both be at the same marginal tax rate. As far as compensatory awards are concerned,
this analysis means, in reality, with spouses in different tax brackets and income generated
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Technically, these are problems outside the question of the funda-
mental value of the assets in the scheme. Nevertheless, they are
real problems affecting the realization of the asset value. In some
instances it may be possible to adjust the valuation model to deal
with the underlying difficulty. For example, where the grant terms,
market regulations, or tax rules delay the liquidation of the asset to
beyond the point when the stock option first nominally is eligible to
be exercised, it might be possible to deal with the problem simply by
extending the notional period of the option for the purposes of
applying the valuation formula. Sometimes, what appears to be a
complication, in fact helps produce a simplifying analysis. Thus, the
fact that an option may only be exercised by an employee,252 and
then only after the divorce, means that the tax treatment resolves
into his or hers alone, so that the distributable value should be the
after tax benefit to that individual, not the aggregate consequences
of two separate after tax treatments.253 Courts, however, may not
be convinced this is a universal truth.'
Not surprisingly, given the potential complexities of using a
valuation technique like Black-Scholes, a number of courts have
by option realization, the actual difference in income will be less than would first appear by
taking the incentive scheme at its face value. Of course, with a bit of luck, these sorts of
problems will only be encountered in those situations were both taxpayers are at the highest
marginal tax rate!
252. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Frederick, 578 N.E.2d 612, 618-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(regarding options that could not be transferred except by will or laws of descent and
distribution and only the employee could exercise the options).
253. See In re Marriage of Harrison, 225 Cal. Rptr. 234, 237, 220-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
254. See Nelson v. Nelson, 222 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The court took the
position it was only if the employee was able to demonstrate what the tax situation would be
when the options were exercised that the court would be required to take the tax
ramifications into account. Nevertheless, the appellate court went along with a trial court
scheme to attempt to allocate some of the possible tax burden to the non-employee spouse.
The appellate court took the view that the "more equitable distribution" scheme would have
been to divide the options in kind and leave each party to the mercy of his or her.oWn tax
circumstance. Id. at 794. Such an approach, while expedient, is hardly equitable, given that
during the marriage both parties would have participated in the benefits after a tax imposed
at a common marginal rate. Some states are totally indifferent to the tax consequences.
Thus, in Indiana, the court may not consider the tax consequences of exercising the option
unless the tax consequences necessarily arise from the plan of distribution itself, presumably,
for example, if one of the spouses was forced by the divorce decree to exercise an option and
then liquidate the cash value. See Hiser v. Hiser, 692 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ind. App. 1998). The
potential gross inequity of this would seem obvious if one considers one spouse receiving
$100,000 in a bank account and another being awarded offsetting options valued at $100,000
before tax, but which might quite possibly trigger a tax liability of as much as $50,000 in
liquidating the value embodied in the option. Some courts find the potential tax liability too
uncertain to justify treatment. Rehfeldt v. Rehfeldt, No. C-850056, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS
5603, at *15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1986). In contrast, some courts have recognized the
need to take into account the tax treatment that will result not only from possible gains, but
also from possible losses. See Chen v. Chen, 416 N.W.2d 661, 664-65 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
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reached for a "down and dirty" solution to the valuation question. 5
Where an option is exercisable, a court may be comfortable with
,the idea that the value of the option is the difference between the
exercise or "striking" or "strike" price and the current market value
of the relevant stock itself.256 This tends to be called the "intrinsic
value" method of valuation.257  The use of this approach starts to
become remarkable when the court adopts it with respect to options
that are not immediately exercisable. 2' Even if the option holder
accepts at the time of trial that all the options will be exercised,259
this in and of itself does not justify using the difference between the
striking price and the market value of the underlying shares as the
method of valuation. All the option holder has done is waive the
impact of contingencies affecting the ability to exercise the option,
not necessarily the impact of other contingencies and risks that
might affect the option's value.26' Assuming the relationship
255. There is no evidence in the cases of courts being willing to use approximations that
the "street" may be comfortable with. Thus, where the stock is traded publicly, one measure
of an options value that is used is that it is worth one-third of the exercise price. See David
Leonhardt, Technology Share Plunge Hurting Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, April, 19, 2000, at
C1. In Baumer v. United States, 580 F.2d 863, 882 n.27 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that a study showed that extended options to purchase quoted stock
which have at least two years to run are worth forty-one percent of the option price and the
value decreases by 1/24 for each month less than two years (citing D. Bret Carlson, Taxation
of"Taxable" Stock Rights: The Strange Persistence of Palmer v. Commissioner, 23 TAX L. REV.
129, 143 n.48 (1968)). It is not clear that these study numbers would hold up under current
market conditions.
256. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 659 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. 1983); Knotts v. Knotts, 693
N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ind. App. 1998). One author views this as a "less than optimal approach,"
but, facetiously, it is not clear from whose perspective. OLDHAM, supra note 197, at
§ 7.11[3][b]. The reality is that even if the option is exercisable, if the option has time to run
before it expires, that time period endows the option with additional value beyond the
intrinsic value because it permits the option holder to participate in even further appreciation
in the value of the underlying instrument. See Les Barenbaum & Walt Schubert, Measuring
the Value of Executive Stock Options, COMP. & BENEFITS REV., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 19, 20.
257. See Davidson v. Davidson, 578 N.W.2d 848, 858 (Neb. 1998).
258. See Green v. Green, 494 A.2d 721, 728-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). If the option is
vested, but not matured - the holder cannot currently sell the option - although his or her
entitlement cannot be denied, the option, in the view of some, may be worth its intrinsic
value, but not its full value. Barenbaum & Schubert, supra note 256, at 5.
259. Everett v. Everett, 489 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). In this case most of
the options had matured, that is, they could be exercised and thus the option holder's premise
they would be exercised is more acceptable. The appellate court, however, stressed the point
those options that were not currently exercisable should not have been given the same present
value as the options that were exercisable because of the contingencies associated with the
options that had not matured. Id. The court does not make it clear, however, whether the
contingent character of the latter group meant that the intrinsic valuation technique that had
been used in connection with the bulk of the options should not be used with the residual
group, or simply that some device should be found to protect the parties' interests in the
ultimate intrinsic value. Id. at 54-55.
260. See OLDHAM, supra note 197, at § 7.11[3][a].
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between the option value and the underlying stock value is indeed
fixed, the value of the option is not simply the difference between
the striking price and the market value of the stock.261 Neverthe-
less, one tends to get the impression that given the choice in
choosing a method of valuation that involves a process analogous to
a graduate seminar in finance - which Black-Scholes' theory-based
formula seem to require - and adopting a first cut approach based
on the simple difference between the striking price and the stock's
market value, the courts go for the latter,262 let the risks be damned.
Issues of valuation also arise when dealing with restricted
stock. This is particularly a problem in closely held corporations." 3
We certainly know the purchase price and, assuming this was paid
during the marriage, this represents one way of measuring the
value of marital property. Indeed, because restricted stock agree-
ments, in the event of forfeiture through premature departure from
the employment, often provide for the stock to be repurchased at the
261. This is because embedded in the option's value is the concept of its "time value," based
on the option holder's limited downside risk if the stock become valueless and the fact that
the holder has not tied up capital, at least to the extent of the difference between the cost of
the option and the price of the underlying stock. Schizer, supra note 145, at 448.
262. Even where the underlying stock lost about ten percent of its value during the trial,
which the trial referee acknowledged, and over twenty percent more between the trial and the
date the decree was entered - which the appellate court on pragmatic grounds considered
did not require recognition. Rehfeldt v. Rehfeldt, No. C-850056, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5603,
at *8, *13-15 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1986). Of note is that all the options were exercisable
at the time of trial. Apparently nobody thought that cashing out the options was appropriate.
This suggests that everyone believed that the realizable market price did not adequately
reflect the value, yet the husband was left with the options, and the risk that the stock would
not recover. The wife received a cash adjustment and had to live with the risk that the stock
would recover. Of course, she could take the cash and go into the market and hedge against
that recovery. Hedging presumably was also open to the husband. The transaction costs
would be a net loss to both parties, a not unexpected outcome in a divorce case.
In Francesco v. Francesco, No. FA990171592S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1349, at
*6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 19,2000), the defendants assets fluctuated twenty million dollars
during a week of the trial and the option holder filed new financial affidavits daily. Although
an acceleration clause caused all the options to vest prior to the court rendering an opinion,
neither at this stage of the proceedings nor in the court's judgment was the option holder
required to realize the value in the options, or even to transfer a portion of the options to the
other spouse - a possibility under the specific scheme. Id. at *6. Instead, after a relatively
short marriage, the court made a lump sum alimony award. The implication seems to be that
the volatility of the options led the court to believe that an award of the options themselves
would make it difficult to ensure that justice could be done to both parties. This seems to be
borne out by the fact that the court ordered the option holder to continue to file post-trial
financial affidavits right up until the court rendered the opinion. Scott Brede, Stocks Play
Havoc In Divorce, 26 CONN. L. TRIB., June 19, 2000.
263. Closely held corporate stock may also have to be valued where we are concerned with
the valuation of options using the intrinsic valuation method. In either circumstance, it has
been pointed out that, given that the shares are not publicly traded, the process may be
expensive. See OLDHAM, supra note 197, at § 7.11[3][a].
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issuing price, they tend to solidify the use of this measure. A better
measure, however, might be one related to a rate of return on the
investment, or to the fair market value of the underlying assets. A
few state courts have taken the view that in the case of restrictive
transfer agreements or buy-out agreements in closely held corpora-
tions, the price established in the agreement will be binding for
valuation purposes, either absolutely or presumptively. The
majority position is that agreements will not control the value in
any divorce, at least if the other spouse did not consent or was not
otherwise bound by the terms of the agreement although a growing
number of jurisdictions hold the terms of the stock transfer
agreement is a factor to be considered. This is not totally surprising
because, at least by some measures, the restricted marketability of
the stock does impact its value.2" By and large though, the
techniques for valuing the stock itself are well established. The
problem in divorce cases, more often than not, is one of liquidity,
namely how to make the payments associated with the distribution
of value when the stock itself cannot be readily sold."'
The problem of illiquidity surfaces in the context of options as
well. The fact that an option may not be exercisable means not only
there are still risks to be faced, but also in principle the option is not
liquid. In this sort of context, valuations achieved by the Black-
Scholes or intrinsic methods, or any other technique may be
theoretically sound but produce difficulties in the real world. This
may not be a problem when it comes to property division, as the
process of distributing the property may be deferred until the
necessary liquidity is achieved.2" Further, in some instances, the
option holder may have other assets that could be transferred
(always assuming that the right degree of comfort can be achieved
with the underlying valuations). Also, there is always the possibil-
ity that some secondary market will recognize the value attributed
to the option by the relevant valuation technique, and liquidity will
be achieved in that market. It probably is a fact of the financial
world, however, the more urgent the need for liquidity, the less
likely it is to be available, and this proposition probably holds true
for a cash-strapped-divorce-pressured household economy as much
264. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 600 A.2d 891 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (citing cases advancing the
same proposition).
265. See id. at 897-98 (requiring the one spouse to pay two lump sums and $30,000 a year
towards paying off an overall award of $700,000).
266. See Chammah v. Chammah, FA 95145944S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1896, at *31
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 1997) (assigning a percentage of contingent resources - stock
options and restricted stock - to each of the parties, notably not in equal shares).
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as any other. In such a context, the illiquidity of the incentive based
compensation scheme may also produce problems in areas other
than property division.
As we saw, under the ALI proposals it may become necessary
after the divorce to make compensatory payments that are designed
to narrow the post-divorce income gap of the former spouses. The
amount payable under any such award will be a function of the
anticipated income disparity. Where the potential obligor receives
compensation in the form of stock options, the question arises
whether the Black-Scholes or intrinsic value techniques should be
used to determine at least an element of the individual's income.
Some aspects of this problem have already been alluded to earlier
in the article." 7
Courts have some experience regarding the relationship
between the exercise of options and the generation of income in the
context of determining child support. The Ohio Court of Appeals
took the view the Black-Scholes model was "designed to reflect
market forces under certain conditions and may not be reliable for
purposes of litigation."2" Instead, that court valued the option for
income determination purposes by taking the increase in value of
the underlying stock during a year referenced to the date of
granting of the option, but only with respect to options that were
exercisable.269 The court took the position that this approach
reflected the fact that the failure to exercise the options amounted
to an investment choice, which the option holder could not use to
shelter his obligations to others.27 ° By using the date of granting the
option, the court intended to avoid gamesmanship by the parties
seeking to use market fluctuations to enhance or minimize the
obligation.27' The court rejected the lower court's valuation
267. See supra text accompanying note 249.
268. Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d 288, 297-98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
269. Id. at 298-99. An unintended consequence of the court's analysis is that if in
computing child support, or indeed "income" for other purposes, one adheres rigorously to
using the notional difference between the stock price and the option exercise price, when the
exercise price is higher than the stock price, the option holder has a notional loss. See Karns
& Hunt, supra note 202, at 263. Should this be deducted from other sources of income in
order to calculate income disparity? Arguably, at least as far as options are concerned, there
is no capital at risk, and accordingly, no loss has been experienced. The same cannot be said
for restricted stock. If the court is willing to force realization of appreciated stock (after the
restrictions are lifted) and treat the result as income, then when the sale of depreciated stock
is required, the loss, represented by the difference between the acquisition costs and the sale
price must be recognized before the "benefit" of the sale to the stockholder can be determined.
270. This approach has been criticized because it may force a sub-optimal return on the
option. See Karns & Hunt, supra note 202, at 255-58.
271. Murray, 716 N.E.2d at 299.
ALIPROPOSALS
technique that had taken the difference between the stock price on
a date "deemed reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the
case" and subtracted from the stock price the exercise price.272 This
amount was then divided by the number of months the option had
been in existence, and was then annualized to produce an "average
annual deferred income."273 In rejecting this approach, the appellate
court took the position that for the purposes of determining income,
it was only the appreciation in value of the stock during a given year
that was relevant.274 In terms of risk allocation, the appellate court,
by limiting its analysis only to exercisable options, placed the risk
of selecting between investment choices on the obligor, and as a
result freed the obligee from all risks associated with the option
scheme itself. As far as "income" in future years is concerned, the
risks of returns on as yet unrealizable options would be shared
equally. This is particularly true in the context of using notional
option exercise to fund child support awards, since ordinarily child
support orders are modifiable. This may be just as well because a
court in Tennessee, as part of its process of crafting a child support
order, adopted a technique of simply averaging the yields from two
prior years of exercising stock options.27 5 Indeed, another Tennessee
decision suggested it might be permissible to determine the obligor's
annual income for child support purposes by averaging the benefits
of a one time exercise of stock options over the time the obligor had
taken to acquire the options.76
The Ohio appellate court's technique just described worked well
in the context of that case because the employee obligor consistently
received options on an annual basis, and the obligee was only
entitled to participate in whatever income stream actually material-
ized. Technically, compensatory awards under the ALI proposal do
not entitle the recipient to participate in any income stream. The
award only attempts to remedy a disparity in anticipated incomes.
Accordingly, in such a situation, reliance only on income that is
currently realizable seems less compelling, and correspondingly, the
Ohio trial court's approach has a certain aesthetic appeal, particu-
larly where the options are awarded on an irregular basis. The
appellate court's approach is practical, however. After all, unlike
272. Karns & Hunt, supra note 202, at 262.
273. Murray, 716 N.E.2d at 296.
274. Id. at 296-98.
275. Stacey v. Stacey, No. 02A01-9802-CV-00050, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668, at *12
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1999).
276. Smith v. Smith, No. 01-A-01-9705°CH-00216, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 733, at *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1997).
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child support orders, the ALI compensatory awards are only
modifiable in a limited set of circumstances. Therefore, simply
basing an award on historical average returns from exercising
options is potentially problematic given that a critical element in
determining the returns, the market price of the underlying stock,
ordinarily will be beyond the control of the employee spouse. The
employee could try to hedge the market price - if he had both the
skill and the resources to do so. It is most likely, however, the effect
of valuing by averaging will leave the obligor alone in shouldering
the risks of finding the money to fund any compensatory order.
IV. ARE THE ALI PROPOSALS AND INCENTIVE BASED COMPENSA-
TION PACKAGES RECONCILABLE?
When it comes to the division of property on divorce, the ALI
proposals envision that the fruits of the spouses' labor during the
marriage will be shared equally. In principle, this should pose few
difficulties when applied to incentive based compensation schemes,
but the realities are otherwise. To achieve an equal division, we
ordinarily have to be certain the benefit will materialize and we
know what its value will be.
Incentive based compensation schemes, however, are subject to
two sets of risk factors that make obtaining the necessary informa-
tion problematic. First, there are market related factors that
generally impinge on the value of the benefit. Where the instru-
ments underlying the scheme are publicly traded this value is
probably identifiable within acceptable limits. Where the instru-
ments relate to a closely held corporation, or where an established
market does not otherwise exist, however, it may be difficult to
know the relevant values at the time of divorce. In this context, the
ALI proposals, which state that the court retain jurisdiction or make
a distribution on a "when and if' basis, are viable provided that the
court making the distribution understands what risks are being
deferred. Ordinarily, unless a market acceptable value can be
identified, it is difficult to imagine how division based on anything
other than equality can be consistent with the ALl proposal of equal
property division. Any other scheme of division would appear to
allocate the risks of a sub-nominal return disproportionately to one
party or the other. This is particularly true because of the other set
of risks personal to the grant recipient that is associated with these
schemes. As we saw, this body of risk includes meeting the
contingencies that will enable the option to vest, the possibility of
employer disruption of the scheme, the tax environment of the
ALIPROPOSALS
individual option or stockholder, and so on. Under this set of risks,
both the existence of the benefit and its value may be threatened.
While the spouses were engaged in a common endeavor, facing
these risks together was an inherent part of the relationship.
Although both the ALI proposals and the case law favor disengaging
the couple as cleanly and quickly as possible, this does not appear
to be achievable when it comes to these incentive schemes, at least
if one hopes to be relatively fair. Essentially, fairness would seem
to require that the couple continue to be exposed to the risk
environment together. Unfortunately for the non-employee spouse,
the divorce itself may modify the risk environment of the incentive
scheme to the non-employee claimant's disadvantage. Unlike
pension benefits where a comprehensive, highly regulated infra-
structure exists to ensure that the diverging interests of the non-
employee claimant are adequately protected, no such pre-structured
mechanism currently exists in the case of incentive based compensa-
tion packages. 27  Isolated courts have attempted to fashion such
protective structures through the use of trust-like mechanisms, with
ground rules that the courts developed on an ad hoc basis. Many
more courts, however, have sought to surmount the uncertainties in
dubious ways, for example by assigning questionable valuations to
the benefits distributed at the time of divorce. Making the distribu-
tion on an unequal basis compounds these bad practices.
Even where the court accepts the realization of the asset or
underlying value is fraught with uncertainty and defers the
distribution, a number of courts seem to lose sight of the fact the
distribution pattern of the spouses' other assets cannot be made at
the time of divorce on the basis that the incentive scheme will
produce particular returns. In this regard the ALI concept of equal
shares is helpful. If the entire bundle of spouses' resources are to be
distributed equally, this distribution pattern can be applied without
unfairness as the assets become available. If the court employs an
unbalanced distribution pattern, the distribution process will be
held hostage until the true benefits of the incentive based scheme
materialize, or the court will face the prospect that the carefully
crafted distribution plan will be undermined when the incentive
package materializes, or fails to materialize. This would be a
significant problem given that generally under existing law and the
ALI proposals, property distributions made at the time of divorce
ordinarily are not modifiable.
277. See Webster & de Lisser, supra note 3, at 146 (citing a variety of Department of Labor
opinions to the effect that stock option schemes are not subject to regulation by ERISA).
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When it comes to the compensatory awards proposed by the
ALI, the relevant benchmark is the anticipated income divergence
of the parties following the divorce. Incentive based compensation
schemes are relevant here in two contexts. First, the benefits may
be distributed as property, but then in due course, generate income
of their own. This expected income must be known in order to make
a compensatory award in the correct amount. This is not a problem
if we know the value of the underlying award. As we saw, however,
that may be a problem! More problematic is the situation where the
incentive based scheme is viewed as a source of income to the
employee spouse. In these situations it is critical to assign a value
to the expected benefit. As we saw, on this issue, courts are in some
trouble. The prevailing favorite approach for valuing options seems
to be to rely on the "intrinsic value" of the option, a method that is
as inaccurate as it is Simple. Even here, however, the technique, as
well as the Black-Scholes approach, does not appear to have been
used as a device for forecasting income. The limited experiences
courts have at this point, from the context of child support cases,
seem to involve a case-by-case approach. The accuracy and coher-
ence of the result is doubtful, and none of the techniques adopted
are fit for universal application. On the plus side, contemporary
awards of spousal maintenance ordinarily are modifiable, and
should certainly remain so if the income in issue is a function of the
performance of an incentive compensation package. Even the ALI
proposal, although it frowns on modification, will tolerate it if either
the obligor's or the recipient's basic income is overestimated. If the
incentive based compensation scheme exceeds expectations,
however, the claimant has no redress. If the excess is more than the
claimant and the obligor anticipated, the claimant is not considered
to be short-changed.
Finally, to the extent that the ALI proposal envisages
restitutionary awards, the amount recoverable is not a function of
benefits receivable under an incentive based compensation scheme.
The claim exists in its own right. With a bit of luck, the employee
will be able to exercise an option, or sell some formerly restricted
stock and meet his or her obligations. If this is not the case, the
obligation persists, and in the ALI's view this is not an unfair or,
inequitable result.
V. CONCLUSION
The upshot of all of this is that the ALI proposals should not be
applied to incentive based compensation packages in a cavalier
ALIPROPOSALS
manner. It is imperative the courts thoroughly understand the
risks actually or presumably assumed within the marriage and how
these risks manifest themselves, either in their original form or as
mutated by the ALI proposals, in the various remedial devices the
ALI is advancing. The courts also need to understand the incentive
based scheme that is under consideration and the risks associated
with it, whether market in origin, or arising from the personal
circumstances of the employee.
Finally, courts have to steer clear of simplistic solutions, such
as exclusively relying on the intrinsic method of valuing options,
however expedient this approach may be, if the court lacks an
understanding of the relationship of the proposed solution to reality.
The development of the relevant doctrine is occurring in the context
of marriages where there is what might be described as an "elegant
sufficiency" of assets, so courts might be inclined to gloss over the
possible consequences of employing a defective valuation technique
or making an unbalanced assignment of risk. In an era where
Congress has found it necessary to legislate the compensation of
hourly paid workers should not include the proceeds from stock
options when it comes to calculating the employee's overtime pay,
defective doctrine may be applied in situations where the errors
matter a great deal.
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